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ABSTRACT 
If properly selected, low-cost commercially available off-the-shelf light- and 
medium-fixed-wing aircraft are sufficient to effectively accomplish special 
operations aviation mission sets in support of special operations ground forces. 
As the nature of combat continues to shift away from traditional state-on-state 
wars to more irregular conflicts, the skills possessed by special operations forces 
(SOF) will become key to a nation’s success in achieving its national security 
aims. While numerous allied nations possess skilled and ready ground SOF 
components, relatively few possess special operations aviation capabilities. This 
lack is largely due to the prohibitively high costs of acquiring and maintaining 
such specialized niche aircraft.  
This study employs a qualitative analysis of candidate aircraft—examining 
acquisition costs, cost per flying hour, aircraft specifications, and scoring against 
a derived list of hallmark qualities of SOF aircraft to assess candidate aircraft 
utility. After evaluating candidate aircraft, it was determined that all four light-
fixed-wing and all three medium-fixed-wing candidate aircraft are fine choices for 
executing SOF support. The Britten-Norman BN2T-4S Defender outscored the 
other candidates, possessing the most hallmark qualities. However, the Pilatus 
PC-6 Porter was the most economically efficient light-fixed-wing platform, costing 
$2M less than the Defender over a typical aircraft lifespan. In the medium-fixed-
wing category, the Alenia Aermacchi C-27J is the clear standout in overall 
performance and utility. More important than these aircraft recommendations, it is 
imperative that preference be based on which aircraft capabilities a nation values 
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SOF effectiveness in this modern threat environment is only 




—Lieutenant General Frank Kisner 
Commander, NATO SOF Headquarters, 2011 
 
A. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
1. Background 
Today, many states are facing a growing number of irregular or 
unconventional threats that dominate the attention of their political and defense 
institutions. These diverse threats have the potential to undermine regional or 
even international stability by creating a “low boil,” enduring conflict for the 
conceivable future. Special Operations Forces (SOF) provide a versatile 
mechanism that is ideally suited to combat these ambiguous and dynamic 
irregular threats. Furthermore, SOF allow national and collective defense 
establishments to retain alternative possibilities of action through employing a 
force that is more agile, flexible, and has a smaller footprint than their 
conventional counterparts. Often, these capabilities are seen as more politically 
acceptable to both the providing nation, and to the nation in which operations are 
conducted.   
However, the flexibility that has become a hallmark trait of SOF has 
historically relied on a synergy of action between elements of air, maritime, and 
ground special operations, operating collaboratively under extremely non-
standard conditions. Lessons learned from operational successes and failures, 
such as the 1980 failed rescue of American citizens from the embassy in Iran, 
                                            
1
 Lieutenant General Frank Kisner, “Special Air Warfare and a Coherent Framework for 
NATO SOF Aviation” (Speech to XXI Seminario Internacional Cátedra Alfredo Kindelán, Madrid, 
Spain, November 14, 2011).  
 2
have clearly demonstrated the benefit of dedicated and habitually associated 
SOF air assets to support the SOF ground component.2 The results of SOF 
organizations without habitual training relationships include mission degradation, 
cancelations, and overall ineffectiveness. As an official North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) study notes, “Ad-hoc attachment of [air assets] and 
capabilities simply fails to create the habitual relationships and ‘no-fail’ 
proficiency required by SOF.”
3
 
Therefore, to ensure success in SOF missions, and to hone SOF tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs), specially equipped air units should be 
established to provide needed support. These associated special air warfare 
units should be properly designated, equipped, and intimately familiar with SOF 
mission particulars and the proficiency required in TTPs that support those 
requirements.   
A key component of effective SOF aviation is the proper selection of 
aircraft to perform the mission. While highly specialized niche aircraft have 
proven to be vital to the United States’ SOF aviation capability, it is unrealistic to 
assume U.S. allies can purchase the same aircraft for their use. Most nations 
lack the resources to procure, maintain, and employ these assets with proficiency 
and for the long term. However, as the NATO Special Air Warfare Manual points 
out, “combat experience has demonstrated that technologically sophisticated 
aircraft are not required for every special air warfare mission.”
4
 What is required, 
however, is a specially trained aviator who can effectively employ an adequately 
equipped aircraft in an extraordinary manner. Given these assumptions, smaller 
nations should perform a cost-benefit analysis to examine the relative utility of a  
low-cost, sufficiently-equipped SOF aircraft. The alternative to employing such a 
                                            2
 Examples of operational successes in which dedicated SOF air support was utilized are the 
1940 German attack on Eben Emael and Israel’s raid on Entebbe in 1976. 
3
 NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Special Operations Forces Study (December 4, 2008), A1. 
4
 NATO, Special Air Warfare Manual Version 1.0 (Shape, Belgium, 2010), 3. 
 3
capability must also be considered: the status quo of reliance on conventional 
airpower assets for SOF support.   
2. Criteria for Employing SOF 
The success of special operations depends largely on the training and 
professionalism of the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen on the objective. 
The SOF Truth that “Humans are more important than hardware” carries more 
weight than its four counterparts: Quality is better than quantity; SOF cannot be 
mass-produced; Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur; 
and Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.5 Yet, a lack of proper 
equipment can force operators to take unnecessary risks in order to accomplish 
their tasking. In planning for a special operation, five key measures must be 
considered. Figure 1 presents the criteria to determine whether to employ SOF.  
 
 
Figure 1. Criteria for employment of SOF.
 6 
                                            5
 U.S. Special Operations Command, Fact Book 2012, 48, retrieved 15 March 2012, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/factbook-2012.pdf. Originally published in John M. 
Collins, Green Berets, SEALs & Spetsnaz:  U.S. and Soviet Special Military Operations 
(Washington, DC: Pergamon Bassey’s, 1987), xiii. 
6
 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–05: Special Operations, II-4, retrieved 22 
March 2012, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3–05.pdf. 
 4
As campaign planners thoroughly analyze the merit of utilizing SOF, they 
must also pursue ways to create efficiencies under the edict of “smart defense.”7 
However, there is a fine line between shrewd cost-saving initiatives and cut-rate 
acquisitions. One is sensible, while the latter is irresponsible. In order for U.S. 
allies to effectively execute special operations of any type, financial resources will 
have to be levied to field an organic air component. 
3. Definitions 
a. Aircraft Weight Classifications 
The category of aircraft referred to in this study as “Light-Fixed-
Wing” includes platforms that weigh no more than 12,500 pounds at Max Gross 
Takeoff Weight (MGTOW).
8
 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) classifies 
aircraft by weight, but does not make a distinction for aircraft weighing less than 
41,000 pounds. Any platform that has a MGTOW of less than 41,000 pounds is 
considered “small.” For reference, the other weight classes are “large” (41,000–
300,000 pounds MGTOW) and “heavy” (greater than 300,000 MGTOW).
9
 
Additionally, in 2007 the FAA began using a fourth category with the introduction 
of the Airbus Industries A-380. This “Super” aircraft is without peer at a MGTOW 
of 1.3 million pounds in its freighter configuration, and 1.2 million pounds in its  
 
 
                                            7
 The term “smart defense” was coined by Lt. Gen. Frank J. Kisner in his Speech to the XXI 
Seminario Internacional Cátedra Alfredo Kindelán, Madrid, Spain, 14 November 2011, and has 
been adopted by NATO. In his speech at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, NATO Secretary 
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen explained that “Smart Defense” is “setting clear priorities for 
what we should spend our defence dollars and euros on.  It means specialising in what nations 
do best.  And it means working more closely together to provide capabilities that no single nation 
can afford.” 
8
 This weight was chosen because aircraft weighing no more than 12,500 pounds at takeoff 
do not require a type rating for the pilot in command. This has the potential for a high cost savings 
in aircrew training, certification, and currency requirements. 
9
 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Appendix A, Aircraft Information Fixed-Wing Aircraft,” 
FAA Air Traffic Organization Policy, Order JO 7110.65U effective 9 February 2012, retrieved 25 
March 2012, http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/ N7110.525.pdf. 
 5
passenger configuration. With the A-380’s worldwide proliferation, and familiarity 
among pilots and air traffic controllers, the Super weight class is now unused, 
leaving the A-380 in the Heavy aircraft category.
10
 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) classifies 
aircraft differently from the FAA. Aircraft weighing less than 15,000 pounds at 
MGTOW are designated “light.” Those with MGTOW between 15,000 pounds 
and 300,000 pounds are “medium.” The ICAO’s weight structure for “heavy” 
aircraft aligns with the FAA: greater than 300,000 pounds. For the purposes of 
this study, ICAO guidelines are used to define “Medium-Fixed-Wing” aircraft 
(15,000–300,000 MGTOW). A comparison of how the two aviation oversight 




MGTOW (lbs) FAA ICAO 
< 15,000 - Light 
< 41,000 Small Medium 
41,000 - 300,000 Large Medium 
> 300,000 Heavy Heavy 
A-380 Super (no longer used) - 
 
Table 1.   Aircraft Weight Classifications 
 
 
                                            10
 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Interim Procedures for A380 Proving and Promotional 
Flights,” FAA Air Traffic Organization Policy, Order JO 7110.478 effective 1 October 2007, 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/ND/ N%20JO%207110.478.pdf. 
11
 EuroControl, “Revising wake turbulence categories to gain capacity,” retrieved 25 March 
2012, http://www.eurocontrol.int/eec/public/standard_page/EEC_News_2008_3_RECAT.html. 
 6
b. Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) 
There are two widely accepted definitions for “Short Takeoff and 
Landing (STOL)”: 
1. The ability of an aircraft to clear a 50-foot (15 meters) obstacle 
within 1,500 feet (450 meters) of commencing takeoff or in landing, 





2. A STOL aircraft is an aircraft with a certified performance capability 
to execute approaches along a glideslope of 6 degrees or steeper 
and to execute missed approaches at a climb gradient sufficient to 
clear a 15:1 missed approach surface at sea level.13 A STOL 
runway is one [that] is specifically designated and marked for STOL 
aircraft operations, and designed and maintained to specified 
standards.14 
c. Multi-mission 
For the purposes of this study, the term “multi-mission aircraft” will 
be utilized to define platforms that possess the design, capability, and equipment 
to enable the execution of various air mission sets on a given sortie. While it is a 
commonly used term in the aviation industry, an agreed-upon definition of “multi-
mission aircraft” is lacking. There are, however, several related terms that serve 
to shape the definition of multi-mission. The Military Dictionary differentiates the 
following often-misapplied terms: 
1. Multi-role:  A vehicle (primarily aircraft) that can be used for more 




                                            12
 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 298, retrieved 23 March 2012, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
13
 A 15:1 climb ratio suggests that for every fifteen feet of horizontal distance on a missed 
approach, a STOL aircraft must be able to climb sufficiently to clear an object an additional foot in 
height. 
14
 U.S. House of Representatives Committee of Science and Technology, 2 (1984) 
(Statement of John Kern, Deputy Director of Flight Operations, Federal Aviation Administration), 
retrieved 10 October 2012, http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/84test/kern1.PDF. 
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2. Swing-role: The ability to employ a multi-role aircraft for multiple 




Historically, aircraft manufacturers have used other derivatives of 
this terminology to market new platforms. For example, the Dassault Corporation 
coined the classification of “Omni-Role” as a marketing term to differentiate its 
Rafale aircraft from other multi-role fighters, like the Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin 
F-35, and the Saab JAS-39 Gripen. This differs from the widely adopted multi-
role description used by rival aircraft manufacturers, largely as a result of what 
Dassault claims is “the aircraft’s ability to provide its pilot with data fused from 
onboard sensors.”17 Examples of this platform’s employment include flights 
conducted in 2011 over Libya in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, where in a 
single mission the aircraft could combine air-to-air, reconnaissance, and air-to-
ground utility.18 While the validity of the air-to-air threat in Libya was arguable, 
what is more important is the striking similarity between this definition and that of 
a swing-role aircraft. Another aerospace corporation, BAE, similarly promotes the 
notion that “an aircraft that can accomplish both air-to-air and air-to-surface roles 
on the same mission and swing between these roles instantly offers true 
flexibility. This reduces cost, increases effectiveness, and enhances 
interoperability with allied air forces.”19 While these definitions complement each 
other, there is inconsistency within the aircraft industry with respect to this 
terminology.  
                                            16
 The Military Dictionary, “swing-role,” accessed 10 September 2012, http://www.military-
dictionary.org/DoD-Military-Terms/A/6/swing-role. 
17
 Craig Hoyle, “France’s Rafale Fighter Proves its ‘Omni-Role’ Skills,” Flightglobal 
International, June 14, 2011, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/ frances-rafale-fighter-
proves-its-omnirole-skills-357687/. 
18




 BAE Systems, “BAE Systems delivers Swing Role Radar capability to Eurofighter 
Typhoon,” retrieved from 15 August 2012, http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/ 
NewsReleases/2001/press_190620012.html. 
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The quintessential multi-mission aircraft is one that airlifts a team to 
execute a direct action mission, airdrops the assaulters, provides surveillance 
during actions on the objective, supports with precision fires, escorts the team to 
an extraction point, and then airlifts it out to friendly lines. While this example 
might be deemed far-fetched, consider the force-multiplication of such an asset. 
Not only is there an outstanding business case for procuring this type of weapon 
system in lieu of multiple single-role platforms, but the ground force commander’s 
perspective is also a valid concern. Having an aircraft overhead at one’s disposal 
that can perform the tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
role and then provide close air support (CAS) as needed is a welcome capability, 
and carries immeasurable weight in terms of perceived force protection of ground 
personnel. 
The notion of developing aircraft with more than one assigned 
mission is almost as old as powered flight. British manufacturers produced the 
first multi-role aircraft as early as 1917.
20
 The Armstrong Whitworth FK.8 proved 
to be a highly versatile platform, taking on a variety of sortie types through its 
production run. The FK.8 was utilized for day and night bombing, ground 
attack/close air support, patrol, and aerial reconnaissance. Alongside the FK.8 as 
a pioneer in multi-role aircraft was the Airco/deHavilland DH.4, a mass-produced 
daytime bomber. Following World War II, the DH.4 served the roles of aerial 
surveyor and crop duster.
21
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 The Avro 523 Pike Short-Range Bomber was the first multi-role aircraft. The 523 was 
developed in response to a British Royal Flying Corps requirement for an airframe capable of 
scouting duties as primary with the role of bombing as secondary. Two airframes were built in 
1916, but the program did not make it beyond the prototype stage.  
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Figure 2.  Armstrong Whitworth FK.8 
 
Figure 3.  Airco/deHavilland DH.4 
d. Commercially Available Off-the-Shelf  
Commercially available off-the shelf (COTS) is defined as any item 
of supply (including construction material) that is: 
1. A commercial item (not government produced); 
 
2. Sold in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace; and 
 
3 Offered to the Government, under a contract or subcontract at any 
tier, without modification, in the same form in which it is sold in the 
commercial marketplace; and 
 
 10
4 Does not include bulk cargo, as defined in Section 3 of the Shipping 





The use of COTS products has been encouraged, and sometimes 
mandated, in many government programs in recent years. Such products 
traditionally offer significant savings in development, procurement, and 
maintenance. 
e.  Cost Per Flying Hour 
Each branch of military service in the U.S. has a distinct process for 
calculating Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) for its weapon systems. Although 
service-specific, these programs are provided with oversight and approval by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense.23 A brief outline of how the U.S. Air Force 
calculates CPFH will set the stage. The CPFH program is standardized across 
the U.S. Air Force. For each aircraft, CPFH is updated every program objective 
memorandum cycle. There are four categories upon which CPFH is based: 
Material Support Division (MSD); General Support Division (GSD); Flying Hour 
(FH) Government Purchase Card (GPC); and Aviation, Petroleum, Oils and 
Lubrications (AVPOL). 
MSD: Material Support Division consists of repairable items (e.g., 
radios, avionics, landing gear). To build the MSD factor, eight quarters (two 
years) of historical data and flying hours are analyzed in order to calculate a 
mean time between failures. This figure is used to model future consumption 
requirements based on projected flying hours and cost inflation. 
                                            22
Acquisitions Central, “Definitions,” retrieved 4 September 2012, 
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/Subpart%202_1.html#wp1145508. 
23
 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Defense Management: DoD Needs Better 
Information and Guidance to More Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support Costs 
of Major Weapon Systems,” July 2010, retrieved 11 September 2012, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10717.pdf. 
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GSD: General Support Division consists of “expendable” bench 
stock items (e.g., nuts, bolts, o-rings, screws). The GSD factor is calculated in 
the same way as the MSD factor: two-year review, determine mean time 
between failures, etc. 
FH GPC: Flying Hour Government Purchase Card is used for items 
costing less than $3,000 that are no longer supported by base supply (e.g., rags, 
metal brushes, tools). There is an exception to this standard, where an item 
costing up to $25,000 can be purchased with Air Logistics Center equipment 
specialist/item manager approval. This exception is rarely exercised, but is 
available for situations when maintenance personnel are unable to acquire an 
aircraft part in a reasonable timeframe, and the part is required to repair a 
grounded aircraft. A three-year average is used to project future funding 
requirements in building the GPC factor. This three-year averaging process was 
incorporated within the last ten years following lessons learned and in an effort to 
smooth out anomalies. 
AVPOL: Aviation Petroleum, Oils, and Lubrications are resources 
used for aircraft servicing. Building the AVPOL factor is conducted using a five-
year average to project future requirements and funding. As in FH GPC 
calculations, lessons learned within the last ten years led planners to use a five-
year average to smooth out anomalies.
24
 
These four components—MSD, GSD, FH GPC, and AVPOL— 
build the U.S. Air Force CPFH budgetary calculations. However, CPFH is only 
one of seven elements in the U.S. Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group 




                                            24
 Richard Jones, Headquarters U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, e-mail 
communication to authors, 23 March 2012. 
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six or seven elements for its service-specific CAIG. Much more complicated than 
CPFH, the CAIG deals with elements such as manpower, base operating 
support, and aircraft modifications.
25
 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the costs and 
benefits associated with procuring, developing, and employing low-cost light-
fixed-wing and medium-fixed-wing aircraft to fulfill the SOF aviation mission. The 
current economically constrained environment justifies exploring the worth of 
cost-effective platforms that can efficiently support SOF core activities by 
employing specialized air mobility; ISR; and precision aerospace fires. This study 
examines whether light-fixed-wing and medium-fixed-wing aircraft allow nations 
and/or alliances to accomplish effective SOF aviation mission sets by possessing 
hallmark SOF aviation qualities. In addition, the study will explore the benefits 
associated with multi-mission aircraft when compared to multiple single-role 
aircraft. Figure 4 lists the select aircraft that will be examined in subsequent 
chapters.   
 
                                            25
 Edward G. Keating and Frank Camm, “How Should The U.S. Air Force Depot Maintenance 
Activity Group be Funded: Insights from Expenditure and Flying Hour Data,” 5, The RAND 
Corporation, 2002, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA408964. 
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Figure 4. List of select light-fixed-wing and medium-fixed-wing aircraft to be 
examined in this study for SOF utility 
Due to perceived costs and aircraft utility, this study will focus exclusively 
on light- and medium-fixed-wing aircraft and not on large-fixed-wing aircraft over 
50,000 pounds max gross takeoff weight. The ideal special operations aircraft 
should be able to operate in varying locations, and it should not be restricted by 
airfield size and conditions. Many future trouble spots around the world are 
limited in quality airfields and most are not able to accommodate large, heavy- 
weight aircraft. A 2006 U.S. Air Force study found that of the 10,326 airfields in 
42 identified priority countries, 90% were unable to accommodate a C-130 or 
larger aircraft due to pavement or landing surface strengths. In addition, 45% of 
the runways were less than 3,000 feet in length.26  
 Cost may also prohibit many smaller nations from operating larger, more 
expensive aircraft. In addition, because this study will focus on U.S. allies and 
alliances, aircraft produced by Russia, China, and other countries with 
contentious relationships with the U.S. will not be considered or reviewed. While 
                                            26
 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, “Posturing the Air Force for the Long War: A Strategic 
Perspective,” (pre-decisional briefing, Air Staff, Pentagon, September 13, 2006). 
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there are many manufacturers worldwide that supply aircraft to individuals, 
businesses, and militaries, this study will focus on aircraft produced by larger 
aircraft manufacturers with a proven history of military support. Some small 
aircraft builders provide excellent products, but the audience of this study may 
favor a larger aircraft manufacturer. An organization, like NATO SOF 
Headquarters (NSHQ), that requires a SOF Air Wing will demand aircraft that can 
be produced rapidly and in mass,27 with readily available replacement parts, and 
have technicians who are familiar with the aircraft systems.   
C. LITERATURE 
The following section presents the literature relating to this inquiry by way 
of three sections: Inherent SOF Aviation Capabilities, Benefits of a Multi-Mission 
Aircraft, and Possible Existing Solutions. The review is designed to address 
Inherent SOF Aviation Capabilities and Light-Fixed-Wing and Medium-Fixed-
Wing Aircraft separately. Finally, the review summarizes relevant literature on 
Possible Existing Solutions.  
1. Inherent SOF Aviation Capabilities 
The literature on Inherent SOF Aviation Capabilities is large and 
composed primarily of empirical literature and military doctrine. While what 
composes SOF aviation capabilities may vary by nation, a few key task sets are 
consistently included. Generally, SOF aviation capabilities are considered to 
enable activities conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped 
aviation forces to support military objectives through unconventional means in 
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. The United States Air Force 
Doctrine Document 1 defines SOF aviation as “the use of airpower operations 
(denied territory mobility, surgical firepower, and special tactics) to conduct the 
following special operations functions: unconventional warfare, direct action, 
                                            27
 Typical government acquisitions processes take years to field aircraft. For the customarily 
immediate need for SOF capabilities, aircraft procurements within months vice years are critical. 
See notes on USSOCOM’s U-28 program below. 
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special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, 
psychological operations, and counter proliferation.”28 Similarly, NATO’s, AJP-
3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations defines SOF air operations as 
primarily “infiltration/extraction and resupply via fixed-wing and rotary-wing 
aircraft.”29 In addition NATO’s AJP-3.5 states, “other special air activities may 
include close air support, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and 
reconnaissance, air-to-air refueling, and personnel recovery, including medical 
evacuation (MEDEVAC), for special operations air, ground, and maritime 
forces.”30   
While United States Air Force Doctrine Document 1 states SOF aviation 
tasks are primarily conducted in low-visibility, covert, or clandestine military 
actions, they have also been conducted across the full spectrum of conflict, 
independently or in conjunction with conventional forces.31 Many of the 
references contain supporting information regarding what makes SOF aviation 
unique. Most of the authors—among them Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe; Admiral William H. McRaven, Commander U.S. 
Special Operations Command; Lieutenant General Frank Kisner, NATO Special 
Operations Headquarters Commander; and Richard Newton, instructor of 
irregular warfare and special operations planning at the Joint Special Operations 
University—agree that like ground and maritime special operations, SOF aviation 
is not defined only by the equipment utilized, but rather by the unconventional 
and innovative ways aircrews employ whatever aircraft they have at their 
disposal. In addition, highly trained airmen, who employ their aircraft in ways 
unexpected by their adversaries, are the driving force behind SOF aviation 
successes. Undoubtedly, having the right aircraft capabilities do still play a 
significant role in the aircrews’ success. 
                                            28
 U.S. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 1: Air Force basic Doctrine, 
Organization, and Command, (November 2003): 53. 
29
 NATO, AJP-3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, (January 2009): 2–6. 
30
 NATO, AJP-3.5, 2–6. 
31
 U.S. Department of the Air Force, Doctrine Document 1, 53. 
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2. Benefits of a Multi-Mission Aircraft  
The literature concerning the benefits of low-cost, multi-mission aircraft is 
not voluminous. Again, the literature is primarily empirical in nature. A recent 
document produced by the U.S. Air Force draws great attention to the current 
financial constraints the United States and other nations are facing. The U.S. Air 
Force Structure Changes: Sustaining Readiness and Modernizing the Total 
Force document explains that the changing geopolitical environments and fiscal 
circumstances of the United States and our allies merit a reassessment of 
defense funding priorities and strategies. Many nations are plagued with 
domestic financial problems while still needing to maintain a modern defense 
force to combat domestic, regional, and transnational threats. As Lieutenant 
General Kisner declared in his Speech to XXI Seminario Internacional Catedra 
Alfredo Kindelan, “a synchronized … Smart Defense approach … is the key to 
success.”32  In addition, the U.S. Air Force Force Structure Changes: Sustaining 
Readiness and Modernizing the Total Force document addresses pending force 
structure changes and calls for an increased emphasis on multi-mission 
platforms as a cost saving tool. The document states, “Multi‐role platforms 
provide more utility across the range of the potential missions for which [the U.S. 
Air Force is] directed” while the U.S. Air Force plans to “retire all aircraft of a 
specific type, allowing us to also divest the unique training and logistic support 
structure for that aircraft.”33 
3. Possible Existing Solutions 
a. Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft 
The concept of fielding light-fixed-wing aircraft in lieu of larger, 
more complex platforms is not new. Even though technology had left propeller-
driven aircraft behind in the jet age, the United States military has fielded several 
                                            32
 Kisner, “Special Air Speech.”  
33
 U.S. Department of the Air Force, USAF Force Structure Changes: Sustaining Readiness 
and Modernizing the Total Force (February, 2012): 3. 
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light-fixed-wing platforms to complement its airborne fleet. These aircraft have 
displayed great mission success despite their lesser capabilities such as speed, 
stealth, maneuverability, operating altitude, firepower, and defensive systems. 
  Since 2006, the U.S. Air Force has fielded three separate light-
fixed-wing aircraft to provide lift (PC-12, M-28) and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (U-28) support to SOF. Additionally, the DoD has given 
consideration to fielding an array of aircraft dedicated to attack missions. This 
study will use the aforementioned Air Force Special Operations Command 
(AFSOC) acquisitions in addition to the following proposed initiatives to provide a 
critical analysis of the ideal fielding options for a SOF air wing. 
The “Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft” Program: 
Although originally envisioned in 2009 as an effort that would procure as many as 
100 airplanes, the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft initiative was 
significantly curtailed in 2010.34 According to the U.S. Air Force Aeronautical 
Systems Center’s Capability Request for Information for Air Combat Command 
(ACC) Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) report, former U.S. Air Force 
Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz considerably reduced the expected 
purchase to only fifteen aircraft.35 Furthermore, according to Greg Grant, editor at 
Military.com, in his article, “Schwartz Shoots Down COIN Plane,” General 
Schwartz also “re-purposed” the program strictly for “building partner capacity” 
(e.g., training foreign pilots), ruling out use of the aircraft in direct combat.36 
The “Afghan Light Air Support Aircraft” Program: Like the Light 
Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft, Air Force Material Command’s 
Aeronautical Systems Center manages the Afghan Light Air Support program. 
According to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition and Deputy 
                                            34
 Stephen Trimble, “Rivals Not Deterred by USAF Shift on Turboprop Fighters,” Flightglobal, 
(15 September 2010), retrieved 10 October 2012, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/rivals-
not-deterred-by-usaf-shift-on-turboprop-fighters-347341/. 
35
 U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Capability Request for Information for Air 
Combat Command (ACC) Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR), Air Force Materiel 
Command (2010). 
36
 Greg Grant, “Schwartz Shoots Down COIN Plane,” DoD Buzz (May 6, 2010). 
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Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs’ report, Afghanistan Light 
Air Support & Basic Trainer/Light Lift Status Update, Version 2, this initiative will 
procure twenty light attack/advanced trainer aircraft for the Afghan Air Force 
(formerly known as the Afghan National Army Air Corps).37 The U.S. Air Force 
plans to begin accepting deliveries in 2013 and receive its last order in 2015.38  
The Defense Technology article “Super Tucano Wins USAF’s Light Attack 
Contest” reported that formal flight evaluations of the Embraer A-29 Super 
Tucano and the Hawker-Beechcraft AT-6 were conducted, and the DoD awarded 
the $355 million contract to Embraer (Sierra Nevada Corporation) in late 2011.39 
However, Hawker-Beechcraft filed suit against the U.S. Air Force in the United 
States Court of Federal Claims, seeking legal review of its elimination from the 
competition. In light of the expected legal review, the U.S. Air Force issued a stop 
work order for the Afghan Light Air Support Aircraft contract that was awarded to 
Sierra Nevada Corporation. As of June 2012, both parties had filed motions to 
the Court and legislation is pending.
40
 
The “AT-6” Program: This is a congressionally mandated 
public/private cooperative effort administered by the U.S. Air National Guard and 
Air Force Reserve Test Center in Tucson, Arizona. Robert Dorr reported in his 
article, “AT-6 Demonstration a Good Deal,” that it is designed to explore the 
potential capabilities of light attack aircraft with the Hawker-Beechcraft AT-6 as a  
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Force for International Affairs, Afghanistan Light Air, 5. 
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 John Reed, “Super Tucano Wins USAF’s Light Attack Contest,” Defense technology, 
December 31, 2011, http://defensetech.org/2011/12/31/embraer-wins-usafs-light-attack-contest/.   
40
 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “U.S. Air Force Says it Briefed Afghan Plane Bidders,” Reuters, June 
13, 2012, retrieved 10 September 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-
afghanistan-planes-idUSBRE85D01S20120614. 
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test platform.41 Separately, Hawker-Beechcraft also proposed the AT-6 as a 
solution for both the Afghan Light Air Support and Light Attack/Armed 
Reconnaissance Aircraft programs.42 
The “Imminent Fury” Program: This joint U.S. Air Force, Navy, 
USSOCOM project utilized a modified Embraer A-29 Super Tucano to explore 
light attack aircraft capabilities tailored specifically for support of SOF ground 
units. Despite rapid technical progress, an ongoing pilot qualification program, 
and an expansion plan that included four additional aircraft beyond the prototype, 
James H. Flatley reported in The Hill’s Congress Blog that this project was 
abruptly cancelled in 2010 for reasons that remain unclear.43  
The “OA-X” Program: This is the U.S. Air Force Air Combat 
Command’s generic designator for a yet-to-be-named observation/attack aircraft 
that would perform many of the tasks required of close air support aircraft in 
irregular warfare. The anticipated capabilities for the OA-X closely match those of 
the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft. The employment concepts for 
the aircraft are outlined in two Air Combat Command white papers, “The Case for 
OA-X” and “The OA-X Enabling Concept.”44 Since the Air Combat Command 
papers describe the OA-X as a possible follow-on to the Light Attack/Armed 
Reconnaissance Aircraft, the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft 
requirements are a useful starting point. These requirements, as stated in the 
2009 Capabilities Request for Information, included twenty-five imperatives and 
nine desirables. Figure 5 lists some of the highlights. 
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 Robert F. Dorr, “AT-6 Demonstration a Good Deal,” Air Force Times, April 30, 2010.  
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 Robert F. Dorr, “AT-6 Texan II Armed Aircraft Showing Progress on Several Fronts,” 
Defense Media Network, March 15, 2011. 
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Blog, entry posted May 4, 2011.  
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 Lt. Col. David J. Torres-Laboy and Lt. Col. Michael W. Pietrucha, Air Combat Command 
White Paper: The Case for OA-X (Washington, DC: ACC/A3D Joint Air Ground Combat Division, 
2009); Michael W. Pietrucha, Mike Saridakis and J. David Torres-Laboy, OA-X Enabling Concept 
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 Jet fuel burning engines 
 An electro-optical sensor 
 Aerial gunnery capability 
 Precision weapons capability 
 Day/night visual flight rules and instrument flight rules capability 
 Capability to operate from semi-prepared surfaces (dirt, grass, gravel) 
 Single-pilot capability with tandem seating, provisions for second pilot 
 
Figure 5. List of select OA-X Requirements45 
There is a large amount of literature on the benefits of light-fixed-
wing aircraft (e.g., cost, simplicity, efficiency). For this reason, the focus of this 
literature review and platforms for examination has been narrowed down in 
scope. Through lessons learned documentation and literature from the above 
fielded/proposed aircraft, and via a capabilities-based approach, this study will 
recommend the ideal light-fixed-wing aircraft to supplement a SOF air wing.  
b. Medium-Fixed-Wing Aircraft 
There is relatively little literature on the SOF utility of medium-fixed-
wing aircraft. Sources primarily consist of government and industry-funded 
conceptual studies and analyses. Currently, United States Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) is teaming in an effort with Air Force Research Labs, AFSOC, 
and Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK) to develop a lightweight, low-cost gunship 
modification, nicknamed “a gunship in a box.” This effort will give countries a roll-
on/roll-off side firing weapons capability that can be used on any number of 
existing cargo aircraft. In addition, in 2008 AFSOC developed a plan for a 
medium sized AC-27J multi-mission “gunship-lite” aircraft. AFSOC’s AC-XX 
Analysis of Alternatives provided initial cost analysis and platform comparisons 
prior to the program being cancelled, per the direction of Congress.46 Finally, 
                                            45
 U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, Capability Request for Information for Air 
Combat Command (ACC) Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR), Air Force Materiel 
Command (2010): 7–10. 
46
 U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, AC-XX Analysis of Alternatives, (June 2, 
2008). 
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NATO recently contracted for a study on what a potential NATO SOF Air Group 
should consist of. The Special Operations Air Group: Concept for Development 
and Organization Study provides an initial look at specific air capabilities NATO 
SOF should consider striving to achieve. While the study does briefly comment 
on the benefits of a multi-role platform, analysis is focused exclusively on 
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance and air mobility 
specific platform capabilities. No analysis is provided on the utility and merit of a 
medium-fixed-wing platform.47    
To fully evaluate potential solutions, an examination of existing U.S. 
and NATO aircraft cost data is required for comparison. The U.S. Air Force 
currently maintains a small fleet of C-27J joint cargo aircraft and the U.S. Coast 
Guard operates a small fleet of CASA aircraft. Records and reports from these 
programs should be able to provide general cost data, logistics requirements, 
and manpower estimates for potential solution aircraft.   
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Empirical Comparisons 
The first phase of this study will begin in Chapter II with a review of 
empirical observations and qualitative data relating to SOF aviation. In this 
section, the study will identify how the battlefield of today is changing and why 
SOF is ideally suited to combat emerging threats. The argument will be made 
that SOF aviation must play a role commensurate with ground SOF investments 
in addressing new threats. In addition, inherent traits and “hallmark qualities” of 
SOF aircraft will be assessed through a review of U.S. and coalition SOF 
doctrine. Finally, Chapter VI of this study will review a small number of SOF 
aviation operational successes in an attempt to further highlight relative 
effectiveness of the identified hallmark capabilities. The AFSOC U-28, Non-
Standard Aviation, and AC-130W programs will be examined, along with 
                                            47
 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, Special Operations Air Group: Concept for 
Development and Organization (April 22, 2010). 
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initiatives such as USSOUTHCOM/Air Force Research Lab’s “gunship in a box 
program” and Jordan’s CN-235 small SOF aerial gunship program.   
2. Qualitative Comparisons 
The second phase of this study is structured as a qualitative comparative 
analysis of light and medium-fixed-wing aircraft in Chapters III and IV. To begin, 
the study will present a broad overview of candidate aircraft platforms. Following 
an overview, each of the alternatives will be evaluated using a bivariate cost 
comparison that examines both raw aircraft acquisition cost and basic aircraft 
CPFH. For the purpose of this study neither organic versus contract maintenance 
support cost or any research and development costs associated with modifying 
the aircraft will be considered. Following the cost comparison, an effectiveness 
analysis will gauge aircraft performance dimensions and capabilities. These 
dimensions and capabilities are then evaluated against the hallmark SOF 
aviation qualities, listed in Chapter II, and a NSHQ-derived desired and minimum 
aircraft capabilities list. Finally, a short discussion on aircraft availability will be 
performed. Using the performance dimensions and the bivariate cost 
comparison, the study will analyze and grade light-fixed-wing and medium-fixed-
wing aircraft that are viable candidates for a SOF aviation platform. Finding will 
be summarized and recommendations will be made in Chapter V. Data for this 
phase was gathered by discussions with subject matter experts and industry 
representatives.   
3. Recommendations 
The final chapter of this study will provide a series of recommendations 
based on the previous analysis. Observations, educated predictions, and 
generalized conclusions about the applicability of light-fixed-wing and medium-
fixed-wing aircraft as cost effective SOF aviation platforms will be made. These 
recommendations may be utilized by NATO members and other U.S. allies if they 
choose to pursue fixed wing SOF aircraft.   
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E. SUMMARY 
Acquiring and employing SOF aviation assets is an expensive venture for 
nations to undertake. Because the nature of irregular and unconventional threats 
to nations is changing, it is important for national leaders to carefully select 
adequate and sustainable SOF aircraft to support their SOF ground component. 
This study proposes that militaries can acquire low-cost, commercially available-
off-the-shelf aircraft, and with slight modifications utilize them to satisfy basic 
SOF aviation roles. While the United States may be able to afford top-of-the-line 
mission-specific SOF aircraft, lower-cost alternatives can suffice for allies with 
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II. WHY SOF AVIATION? 
Change is one of the few constants in the new environment, which 
is why the agile and innovative mindset of SOF and SOCOM is so 
critical to helping secure the future.
48
 
—Michael D. Lumpkin, 2011 
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict 
 
As most modern conflicts are of an irregular nature, special operations 
forces (SOF) will play a growing role before, during, and after these wars. While 
many U.S. allies have capable SOF ground forces, relatively few have any sort of 
dedicated SOF aviation support. In order to reap the full benefits that special 
operations bring to the table, nations should consider investing in low cost light- 
and medium-fixed-wing aircraft to accompany their SOF ground components. In 
doing so, nations should consider that there are certain hallmark qualities that 
SOF aircraft should possess in order to accomplish basic SOF mission sets (i.e., 
specialized air mobility; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and 
precision aerospace fires). Investing in properly equipped and capable aircraft 
will ensure the future success of U.S. allies in navigating the irregular warfare 
battlefield.    
A. CHANGES IN MODERN WARFARE 
Many defense and security establishments around the world recognize 
that irregular conflicts are on the rise and may dominate warfare for the 
foreseeable future, while the number of conventionally-fought wars is declining. 
The 2006 United States Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) points out, “the 
long war against terrorist networks will extend far beyond the borders of Iraq and 
Afghanistan and includes many operations characterized by irregular warfare—
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operations in which the enemy is not a regular military force of a nation-state.”49 
In addition, Sebastian Gorka, Associate Professor at the National Defense 
University, points out, “no longer is the enemy limited by the resources his 
national population represents.”50 The definition of war that pertains only to 
nations in a state-on-state conventional war is dead.   
These irregular threats, as defined by the United States Department of 
Defense Joint Publication 1–02, present “a violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular 
warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full 
range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will.”51 Allies of the United States will be forced to confront a 
growing number of irregular threats through a variety of conventional and 
unconventional military means.52 
Dr. James Russell, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the 
United States Naval Postgraduate School, explains that conventional interstate 
warfare between developed states has been on the decline since 1990. In its 
place, intra-societal and ethnically organized warfare is on the rise.53 Russell 
goes on to say, “Shaped by political disputes, we have witnessed multiple 
attempts at ethnic separatism through violent means and clashes created by 
Islamic militants pursuing an anti-globalization and anti-modernity agenda. These 
wars tend to involve actors waging what could be characterized as irregular war 
in that the war is not waged between organized state-based militaries.”54   
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In his 2007 treatise on modern warfare, retired British Army General Sir 
Rupert Smith echoed Russell’s warnings. Smith suggests that a paradigm shift in 
war has occurred, and war of the traditional nature no longer exists. He writes,  
“War as cognitively known to most non-combatants, war as battle in a field 
between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in 
international affairs:  such war no longer exists.”55 Instead, Smith states, the 
world is in a new era of conflict—”wars among the people.”56 Smith believes 
these wars are characterized by six trends:57 
1. The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives 
of interstate industrial war that decide a political outcome, to more 
malleable objectives of individuals and societies that are not states. 
 
2. We fight among the people, not on the battlefield. 
 
3. Our conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending. 
 
4. We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risking all to gain 
the objective. 
 
5 On each occasion, new uses are found for old weapons that were 
constructed for use in industrial war against soldiers and heavy 
armament. 
 
6. The sides are mostly non-state, comprising some form of multi-
national grouping against some non-state party or parties. 
 
These cautions are transferable to U.S. partners and alliances such as 
NATO. If the warnings of Russell, Smith, and others are reasonable—that conflict  
has changed over the last quarter century away from large Westphalian 
industrialized battles—then forms of unconventional military power should be 
more thoroughly explored. These new threats are less apparent, more difficult to 
anticipate, and threaten to undermine international stability through persistent 
“low-boil” conflict. Given the prevalence of irregular threats in the current and 
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expected future operating environment, the U.S. government and its allies must 
become as proficient in addressing irregular threats as they are in confronting 
conventional or regular threats.   
B. SOF:  THE RIGHT FORCE FOR THE JOB  
As Russell points out in his “Irregular Warfare and Future War,” the U.S. 
government is restructuring its military toward a force better equipped to deal 
with growing irregular threats. In the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
(QRM) Report, the Department of Defense (DoD) established Irregular Warfare 
as one of its six core mission areas.58 The 2009 QRM stresses, “Irregular 
Warfare encompasses operations in which the joint force conducts protracted 
regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to 
subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeat them through 
direct conventional military confrontation.”59  
In response to U.S. government policy makers, in 2010 the United States 
Joint Forces Command and the United States Special Operations Command co-
authored a Joint Operating Concept (JOC) entitled Irregular Warfare (IW): 
Countering Irregular Threats v. 2.0. This IW JOC was written as part of a larger 
effort to institutionalize the skills and abilities needed to combat adaptive 
adversaries, such as terrorists, insurgents, criminal networks, and states that 
increasingly resort to forms of irregular warfare. These adversaries often utilize  
methods such as guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion. To combat these 
activities, the IW JOC highlighted five principal activities or operations that can be 
utilized. These are counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal 
defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations.60 The IW JOC 
states, “Rather than treating them as five separate activities or operations, 
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however, the joint force will blend these complementary activities into a coherent 
campaign tailored to the specific circumstances.”61   
While these five activities can often be conducted by general purpose 
forces, they fall, by and large, under the charge of SOF. The United States DoD 
Joint Publication 3–05: Special Operations outlines eleven core activities 
(presented in Figure 6) that SOF are “specifically organized, trained, and 
equipped to accomplish.”62 Four of the five “countering irregular warfare activities” 
(presented in red in Figure 6) in the IW JOC are on the SOF core activities list. 
Joint Publication 3–05 further points out that “while conventional forces also 
conduct many of these activities (e.g., foreign internal defense (FID), security 
force assistance (SFA), counter insurgency (COIN), and counter terrorism), SOF 
conduct them using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and to 
unique conditions and standards in a manner that complement conventional 
forces capabilities.”63 
 
Figure 6. List of special operations core activities as defined in Joint 
Publication 3–05: Special Operations
64
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According to the IW JOC and Joint Publication 3–05, the United States 
and many of its allies are placing a greater emphasis on both SOF and COIN 
capability.65  Since 9/11, special operations and the forces needed to conduct 
these have become a prominent part of the United States and its allies’ military 
strategies. In order to combat growing irregular threats, many nations are turning 
to specially equipped and trained forces to operate in these ambiguous and 
dynamic environments. In his 2011 speech to the XXI Seminario Internacional 
Catedra Alfredo Kindelan, Lieutenant General Frank Kisner, NATO SOF 
Headquarters (NSHQ) Commander, elaborated that “SOF allow national and 
collective defense establishments to retain freedom of action through employing 
a force with traditionally a smaller footprint than their conventional counterparts, 
and therefore one which may be more politically acceptable to both the providing 
nation, and to the nation in which operations are conducted.”66 Lt. Gen. Kisner 
further stated, “a nation unwilling or unable to employ SOF may be faced with  
conventional alternatives that may not possess the geographical reach, the 
required rapidity of response, the ability to apply force discriminately, or the 
appropriate level of discreetness.”67   
C. SOF AVIATION:  THE MISSING LINK  
1. A Critical Shortfall for U.S. Allies 
While many U.S. allies’ ground SOF capabilities continue to grow, their 
SOF aviation capabilities are insufficient to support them.68 Of the 26 NATO 
nations possessing a dedicated SOF ground force, only six are able to provide 
SOF air support in any capacity: the United States, Italy, Canada, United 
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Kingdom, Turkey, and France.69 This presents a problem when considering 
NATO’s declared emphasis on addressing “instability or conflict beyond NATO 
borders [that] can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering 
extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in 
arms, narcotics and people.”70 Without proper SOF aviation support, history 
indicates the probability of success in these environments is low.71   
Of the three principal tasks assigned to NATO SOF—special 
reconnaissance, direct action, and military assistance—SOF aviation is essential 
to the first two. Also, SOF air transport plays a role in military assistance and 
related SOF activities such as air-land integration, personnel recovery, and 
forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations.72 The NSHQ Special Air 
Warfare Manual states, “the primary mission of special operations air forces is 
enhanced air mobility—specialized air transport activities via fixed-wing, rotary-
wing, or tilt-rotor aircraft.”73  Ground SOF must have means of transport to the 
area of operation, and air transport must be an option. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Special Operations Forces Study further points out, “SOF mobility 
needs are diverse and essential to mission success.”74  The study emphasizes 
“when considering mobility requirements, nations should do so taking into 
account the pragmatic declaration from the NATO [Comprehensive Political 
Guidance] CPG that attacks may increasingly originate from outside the Euro-
Atlantic area.”75 
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Although resource intensive, air assets are essential to the conduct of 
ground SOF operations.76 The May 2011 NATO SOF Air Mobility Study found: 
[H]istorical SOF air enabler shortfalls negatively impact current 
NATO SOF operations and severely restrict NATO SOF’s ability to 
support future operations. Furthermore, a conclusion of the study 
was that shortfalls within many individual NATO member nations 
were of such  magnitude that in addition to the NSHQ’s efforts to 
build and enhance  national SOF aviation capabilities through 
common doctrine, standards, and tactics/techniques/procedures, 
the establishment of a pooled NATO SOF operational aviation 
capability would further help mitigate the SOF air enabler shortfall.77 
Besides specialized air mobility, other key special air warfare activities 
such as ISR and close air support (CAS) also play a vital role in special 
operations. Special operations are normally planned in great detail and require 
unfettered access to ISR assets. Lack of timely, detailed, and dedicated 
intelligence for the SOF operator can lead to mission failure or compromise.78     
Similarly, dedicated CAS allows for greater battlefield flexibility and immediate 
attention to time-sensitive targets. Given these considerations, and the 
recognition that SOF must be able to rapidly generate and project scalable force 
packages with organic assets, it is essential that a SOF aviation capability be 
pursued by U.S. allies, such as NATO members.   
2. Low-Cost Considerations for SOF Aviation 
Even fixed-wing aircraft can sometimes prove to be prohibitively costly to 
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While specialized aircraft have an important niche in extending the 
capabilities of special air warfare forces, such high-end capabilities 
are costly to procure and to sustain in terms of equipment/logistics 
and aircrew training. Combat experience has demonstrated that 
technologically sophisticated aircraft are not required for every 
special air warfare mission.79   
Most U.S. allies will not require a fleet of expensive MC-130 Combat 
Talons/Shadows. While the AFSOC MC-130 platform is most often utilized to 
conduct airlift missions in support of SOF, not all missions require such a 
technically advanced and expensive aircraft. While AFSOC is “flying the wings off 
its Combat Talons,” as Richard D. Newton writes in JSOU Report 06–8: Special 
Operations Aviation in NATO, many missions could be accomplished by simpler, 
more cost-effective airframes.80 A similar low-cost, low-technology aircraft could 
fulfill the needs of many allies’ SOF air component. 
First, when considering the economic constraints of many U.S. allies, the 
SOF aircraft that the United States can afford may be beyond their budgetary 
reach. For example, Australia’s 2012 defense budget is $24.2 billion, or 
approximately 3% of that of the United States.81 It is not realistic to expect 
Australia and allies with similar defense budgets to acquire and operate a varied 
and diverse fleet of highly specialized SOF aircraft. The need for low-cost SOF 
aircraft is compounded by Russell’s warning: “[O]ver the next quarter century, 
developed and developing states may follow the lead of Europe and start 
spending less on defense with a resultant reduction in the sizes of their 
conventionally structured militaries.”82 Second, most U.S. allies do not strive to 
unilaterally project SOF power globally, as the United States does. Their armed 
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forces are inwardly focused on border security, internal stability, and regional 
alliances.   
For these two reasons—(1) defense budget constraints and (2) inward 
focus on border security—nations desiring a SOF aviation capability should 
consider a more cost-effective solution to fixed-wing SOF aviation. Before 
investing in expensive “niche” aircraft, their defense ministries should explore 
which SOF aviation capabilities are necessary to sufficiently accomplish their 
national security objectives. Programs designed around lower cost commercial of 
the shelf (COTS) aircraft, aircraft with low cost per flying hour (CPFH), and 
aircraft equipped to handle carry on/carry off equipment as the mission dictates 
should be evaluated. Finally, allies should explore recent United States 
successes with multi-mission aircraft, or aircraft that can be easily equipped to 
perform many mission sets [i.e., transport, CAS, or ISR].  
D. INHERENT TRAITS OF SOF AVIATION 
Of the five SOF truths embraced by USSOCOM, the first is “Humans are 
more important than hardware.”83  The NATO Special Air Warfare Manual agrees 
that it is the capabilities of people that make special air warfare successful, and it 
further states, “[c]ombat experience has demonstrated that technologically 
sophisticated aircraft are not required for every special air warfare mission.”84 
Accordingly, low-cost COTS aircraft could be capable of successfully executing 
SOF aviation operations, provided the right people and training.     
1. SOF Missions 
United States Air Force Doctrine Document 2–7: Special Operations 
identifies ten core missions that AFSOC is charged with executing in support of 
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USSOCOM and Secretary of Defense guidance.85 Moreover, NSHQ’s Special Air 
Warfare Manual presents similar capabilities SOF aviation should be able to 
perform in support of the principle tasks assigned to NATO SOF.86 Of these, 
three stand out as basic missions that emerging SOF aviation-capable allies 
should focus their efforts on to combat irregular threats. These three areas are: 
1. Specialized Air Mobility 
 
2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
 
3. Precision Aerospace Fires  
 
Figure 7 presents each of these with a definition taken from U.S. doctrine.     
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2. Hallmark Qualities of SOF Aircraft 
While these three SOF aviation mission sets establish the general 
capabilities SOF aviation should possess, they do not translate well into actual 
SOF aircraft requirements or analysis criteria. In order to execute missions in 
diverse environments and battlefields, there are hallmark qualities that light and 
medium fixed-wing SOF aircraft should possess. From the early days of SOF 
aviation in World War II to present-day counterterrorism operations, SOF aircraft 
have possessed these hallmark qualities, allowing aircrew to better support SOF 
ground operations. These qualities, derived from readings on historical U.S. SOF 
operations, U.S. SOF aviation doctrine, and NATO doctrine, will allow an 
emerging SOF aviation power to support the three SOF aviation mission sets. 
Figure 8 outlines these qualities as they apply to all SOF aircraft, SOF mobility 
aircraft, SOF ISR aircraft, and SOF precision aerospace fires aircraft. In 
subsequent chapters, these qualities will be used, along with other aircraft 
specifications and cost comparisons, as grading criteria for a range of potential 




Figure 8. Hallmark Qualities of SOF Aviation. 
E. SUMMARY   
As warfare continues to trend toward irregular adversaries, SOF will 
continue to be employed to combat them. In order to benefit from the full 
spectrum of options SOF brings with them, U.S. allies should consider the value 
of investing in practical SOF aviation components as well. While each nation may 
differ on what they qualify as SOF aviation, this study recommends that at a 
minimum aircraft possess numerous, if not all, of the hallmark qualities of SOF 
aviation. The likely future operating environment, characterized by a distributed, 
non-contiguous battlespace, will not require every special operations aircraft to 
possess the full suite of specialized systems found in the U.S.’s AFSOC aircraft. 
If allies do find themselves in need of such aircraft, they can call on the United 
States and other partner nations for assistance.   
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III. LIGHT-FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this section of the study is to provide an analysis of the 
costs and benefits associated with developing, procuring, and employing light-
fixed-wing aircraft in support of Special Operations Forces (SOF). The 
examination considers four light-fixed-wing platforms to determine whether they 
effectively support the Special Operations Core Activities detailed in Chapter II. 
Specifically, direct action, special reconnaissance, and military assistance are 
analyzed. These three core activities do not nest exactly into the mold in which 
the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM) highlighted in their 2010 Joint Operating Concept (JOC) entitled 
Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats v. 2.0.88 The Core Activities 
examined herein do, however, lend themselves nicely to the competencies of 
light-fixed-wing aircraft. Through the lens of these three core activities, the 
operating capabilities of light-fixed-wing aircraft are then surveyed with reference 
to the primary SOF aviation mission sets as defined in Figure 7.–1.) Specialized 
air mobility, 2.) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and 3.) 
Precision aerospace fires.89 Finally, this analysis of alternatives will examine 
whether a multi-mission aircraft is a good fit to support these mission sets in lieu 
of fielding multiple single-role platforms. 
B. SOF’S CORE ACTIVITIES 
Three of the principal task areas with which all SOF are charged are direct 
action, special reconnaissance, and military assistance. In order to determine 
how airpower can enable greater mission success rates, this section takes pause 
to dissect each of these tasks. For an exhaustive list of the missions the U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff deems “Special Operations Core Activities,” reference Figure 
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6. A description of the three chosen Core Activities follows, as well as rationale 
for dedicated SOF airpower support. Specifically, this study focuses on the 
critical mission sets in which emerging SOF aviation-capable establishments 
should focus efforts in order to combat irregular threats, as defined by the U.S. 
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2–7.90 
1. Specialized Air Mobility 
 
2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
 
3. Precision Aerospace Fires 
 
1. Direct Action 
Direct action entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive 
actions conducted as special operations in hostile, denied, or diplomatically 
sensitive environments. These operations employ specialized military capabilities 
to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. 
Normally limited in scope and duration, direct action usually incorporates an 
immediate withdrawal from the planned objective area. Although classically 
considered close combat, direct action also includes sniping and other standoff 
attacks by fire delivered or directed by SOF. Standoff attacks are preferred when 
the target can be damaged or destroyed without close combat. Direct action 
missions may also involve locating, recovering, and restoring to friendly control 
selected persons or materiel that are isolated and threatened in sensitive, 
denied, or contested areas.91 
The diverse requirements of direct actions are greatly enhanced by all 
three competencies of dedicated light-fixed-wing air support.  
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a. Specialized Air Mobility 
While assault forces are traditionally inserted by helicopter or make 
their approach to the objective by vehicle or foot patrol, the correct short takeoff 
and landing (STOL) aircraft could fill this void. The same holds true for exfiltration 
of the ground force. As defined in Chapter I, STOL aircraft require less than 
1,500 feet of landing area, and in reality, many aircraft reviewed herein need 
substantially less. Beyond support of ground operations in direct action, aircraft 
with lift capability can also assist in reconstituting personnel to friendly control 
after recovery. 
b. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Direct action missions without the support of ISR became 
exceptionally rare in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts following 9/11. 
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets normally accomplish the 
“find and fix” task that precedes any direct action, often providing the “trigger” 
that launches an assault. During the planning and rehearsal process, ISR aircraft 
are utilized to corroborate satellite imagery or national-level intelligence. This 
information is frequently difficult for analysts to decipher, and putting “eyes” 
overhead in real time assists in putting the virtual puzzle pieces together. In 
addition to further resolution of the target objective, aircrew can use their subject 
matter expertise to help devise infiltration and exfiltration routes for the assault 
team. Then, on infiltration, the now-familiar ISR aircrew is prepared to perform 
escort duty, advising of any potential threats. 
During actions on the objective, ISR is invaluable. At the moment of 
breach, containing fleeing enemies is a great concern. If positive identification of 
inhabitants of a compound, for example, is lost, well being of the ground party is 
at stake. Additionally, over watch, or general cordon-search of the area, allows 
commandos to focus on their immediate threat without concern for a potential 
ambush. If a “stack” of aircraft is in support of a direct action, the ISR platform is 
frequently assigned Tactical Air Controller-Airborne (TAC-A) duties, especially if 
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the ground-to-air liaison element is too absorbed to control the air assets. An ISR 
aircraft can also enable effective command and control, both for the ground force 
commander (GFC) and higher headquarters (HHQ). With their “big picture” of 
what is unfolding during a direct action and a direct communications link with 
multiple parties on the ground, the ISR aircrew can keep the GFC’s situation 
awareness high as well as keep HHQ informed of developments and results of 
the assault. 
In preparation for exfiltration, ISR aircrew can select a rally point for 
the ground party and suitable helicopter-landing zone (HLZ) if the commandos 
are to be lifted off target. Furthermore, if the ISR platform is so equipped, infrared 
illumination of the HLZ allows for a blacked-out arrival, pickup, and departure of 
the assault force, further facilitating security of the friendly force. Once the 
ground team is off-target, ISR aircraft can lead the recovery asset(s) out of the 
non-permissive area. 
Finally, following direct action missions, intelligence analysts are 
often interested in post-operation reflections at the target site. Again, tactical ISR 
platforms perform this important task to facilitate follow-on special operations 
efforts. 
c. Precision Aerospace Fires 
A light-fixed-wing aircraft with strike capability is also useful in direct 
action. During the infiltration phase of the operation, assaulters can be provided 
an armed escort, regardless of their mode of transportation (helicopter, vehicle, 
or foot patrol). Additionally, target preparation/softening the target area can be 
accomplished with a light-strike platform. While on the objective, close air support 
is often required to subdue enemy hostility. Finally, clearing an exfiltration route 
with preemptive strikes and/or suppression fire is a valid means of paving the 
way for the ground force’s safe return to base. 
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2. Special Reconnaissance 
Special reconnaissance entails missions conducted as special operations 
in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments to collect or verify 
information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities 
not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive 
collection capability for commanders and supplement other conventional 
reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Special reconnaissance includes target 
acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance, and may be 
accomplished by air, land, or maritime assets.92 
a. Precision Aerospace Fires 
Strike platforms can be useful in special reconnaissance missions, 
as they provide for armed escort of either ground forces executing a mission or 
unarmed ISR aircraft enroute to/from an objective as well as while on target. 
b. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Special reconnaissance missions employ the most fundamental 
capabilities of ISR aircraft. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
platforms that are dedicated to SOF can offer unique and specialized capabilities 
not available to conventional forces. These capabilities are afforded by SOF’s 
exclusive relationship with interagency partners and the technology these 
organizations bring to the fight. This collaborative effort across the spectrum of 
defense and security agencies acts as a force multiplier not realized at the 
general purpose forces level. Light-fixed-wing aircraft, in particular, possess 
unique characteristics rarely enjoyed by other military assets. A few examples 
include civilian paint schemes, low noise and visual signature, and widely 
proliferated aircraft types. These qualities, along with a typically small aircrew 
requirement and logistics trail make the small footprint of light-fixed-wing aircraft 
ideal for providing dedicated and tailored ISR support to SOF. These attributes 
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are pivotal when operating in denied or diplomatically sensitive areas of 
responsibility. 
3. Military Assistance 
Military assistance is not represented in the U.S. Joint Forces Command 
and U.S. Special Operations Command 2010 JOC entitled Irregular Warfare:  
Countering Irregular Threats v. 2.0. However, this Core Activity was chosen for 
analysis due to its utility beyond the ambitions of the United States. In other 
words, military assistance encompasses a broader spectrum in which to employ 
SOF, which may be more aligned with another nation/coalition’s interests. The 
Initial Capabilities Document for NATO Special Operations Air Warfare Center, 
published by USSOCOM, is very compelling in specifying that, “military 
assistance is a broad SOF Principle Task [that] goes well beyond training and 
advising and involves combined combat operations.”93 While this is a valid 
assessment, the document provides no further detail on what precisely military 
assistance encompasses. For the purposes of this study, military assistance is 
defined as a combination of foreign internal defense (FID) and security force 
assistance (SFA). The primary roles in FID are to assess, train, advise, and 
assist host nation military and paramilitary forces with activities that require the 
unique capabilities of SOF.94 The goal is to enable host nation forces to maintain 
internal stability, to counter subversion and violence in their country, and to 
address the causes of instability. Similarly, SFA consists of organizing, training, 
equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of foreign security 
forces.95 The main difference between FID and SFA is that the latter helps 
prepare foreign security forces to defend against external threats. 
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Much like Direct Attack missions, all three competencies of light-fixed-wing 
aircraft (specialized air mobility, ISR, and precision aerospace fires) provide 
support to the requirements of military assistance. The capabilities with which a 
partner nation requires assistance will dictate the type of light-fixed-wing aircraft 
to be employed. Any of the unique mission sets described above could be 
offered “a la carte” and packaged together for the partner nation of interest. While 
a multi-mission platform would be a good fit for any Core Activity of SOF, the 
requirements of military assistance scream for this capability. 
C. AIRCRAFT CANDIDATES 
There is considerable literature on the benefits of light-fixed-wing aircraft 
(e.g., cost, simplicity, efficiency). There are also many manufacturers worldwide 
that supply light-fixed-wing aircraft to individuals, businesses, and militaries. 
While some small aircraft builders are renowned for providing excellent products, 
a nation or coalition that warrants dedicated SOF aircraft will likely favor a larger 
aircraft manufacturer. An organization that demands special operations airpower 
will require aircraft that can be produced rapidly and in mass, possess readily 
available replacement parts, and have technicians who are familiar with the 
aircraft systems. For this reason, the focus of this study and platforms for 
examination has been narrowed down in scope. The light-fixed-wing aircraft 
herein represent a small sampling of the many viable options on today’s market. 
They have a few traits in common, all of which are important considerations for a 
SOF air component. Each of these platforms has proven itself worthy, both in the 
private sector as well as in military/security operations. In fact, the U.S. Air Force 
either currently or has in its history operated three of the four platforms as utility 
aircraft in combat (AU-23A, aka Porter; U-27, aka Caravan; UV-18B, aka Twin 
Otter).96 The only platform not employed by the U.S. is the Defender, which is 
operated by over thirty other countries worldwide. Included in this extensive list is 
the United Kingdom, whose Army Air Corps has combat employed the Defender 
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with great success in Northern Ireland and Iraq.97 All of these aircraft are 
prevalent across the globe, and do not overtly suggest a military presence. In 
fact, each aircraft was initially manufactured for the civilian sector, and all four 
continue to be marketed to the general public. 
 
Figure 9. Cessna C-208 Caravan with Cargo Pod 
 
Figure 10. Pilatus PC-6 Porter 
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Figure 11. Viking Air DHC-6–400 Twin Otter 
 
Figure 12. Britten-Norman BN2T-4S Defender 
1. Multi-mission Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft 
A dedicated SOF air component will likely resemble the U.S. Air Force 
Special Operations Command (AFSOC) in some of its aircraft requirements. As 
of mid-2012, AFSOC was in the process of determining what type of FID aircraft 
 48
to field in order to answer the demand signal of worldwide partner nations. 
Desired mission set configurations are listed in Table 2. 
 
Desired Configurations for AFSOC FID Aircraft 
STOL, day/night low level infiltration/exfiltration (personnel and cargo) 
Airdrop of personnel and small pallets/bundles 
ISR/over watch/Command and Control 
Casualty Evacuation, Medical Evacuation 
Counter-Narcotics 
Border Patrol/Maritime Operations 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
 
Table 2.   Desired Configurations for AFSOC FID Aircraft98 
The list of requirements for this aircraft is lengthy; it will be the 
quintessential multi-mission platform. In fact, the U.S. Air Force Force Structure 
Changes: Sustaining Readiness and Modernizing the Total Force document 
addresses pending force structure changes and calls for an increased emphasis 
on multi-mission platforms as a cost saving tool. The document states, “… multi‐
role platforms provide more utility across the range of the potential missions for 
which we are directed” and goes on to recommend the U.S. Air Force “retire all 
aircraft of a specific type, allowing us to also divest the unique training and 
logistic support structure for that aircraft.99 All said, the fact that AFSOC is 
seeking to field a platform with such robust capabilities is no coincidence. 
Likewise, in adhering to the directive of smart defense, this is the type of initiative 
that will gain efficiencies and pay huge dividends for any military outfit.  
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D. MEASURES OF ANALYSIS 
1. Cost  
a. Acquisition Cost 
The four aircraft chosen for analysis herein have remarkably similar 
acquisition costs. Aside from the significantly larger Twin Otter, the difference in 
aircraft cost is at most $300,000. This initial fiscal commitment is important in the 
selection process, especially considering most organizations will require multiple 
platforms to support SOF activities. A single air asset is hardly capable of 
meeting the needs of most special operations, thus based upon the 
organization’s fleet requirement, price gaps between potential platforms will be 
compounded. An additional consideration in the acquisitions process is the price 
basis per aircraft, which can vary widely depending on the number of orders 
placed. Absolute procurement costs of the four light-fixed-wing aircraft examined 
are detailed in Table 3. 
 
Aircraft Cost Source 
Cessna 208 $2.3M100 Cessna Aircraft 
Pilatus PC-6 $2.0M101 Flight Global 
Britten-Norman BN2T-4S  $2.1M102 Jane’s IHS 
Viking Air DHC-6 $3.6M103 Aviation Today 
Table 3.   Select Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Acquisition Cost 
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b. Cost Per Flying Hour 
With the prelude of Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) provided in 
Chapter I, a summation of aircraft-specific CPFH follows. For reference, the U.S. 
Air Force CV-22 Osprey costs $13,840 per hour to operate. This is the costliest 
aircraft in AFSOC’s inventory. At a fraction of the CV-22’s cost, the UH-1N Huey 
costs just $2,509 per hour to operate.104 The CPFH numbers presented below are 
Contracted CPFH, or CCPFH. They must not be confused with that of the CV-22, 
a traditional “blue suit” maintained platform. There are many different factors 
considered when aircraft maintenance contracts are introduced. For example, the 
CCPFH is dependent on numerous issues not included in standard U.S. Air 
Force CPFH calculations, such as the number of operating locations, the degree 
of contract maintenance and supply management services required, personnel 
costs, etc. 
The following three platforms are light-fixed-wing aircraft that 
AFSOC procured within the past six years. The mission specifics of the aircraft 
are discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section, but the unique thing of 
the platforms is the fact they are serviced and maintained by Contract Logistics 
Support (CLS), rather than “blue suit” technicians. In the case of these programs, 
contractors are required to provide for an 80 percent mission-capable rate. The 
costs associated with aircraft upkeep do not include aircraft acquisition costs or 
aircrew expenses. The figures do, however, include: 
1. Fuel cost 
 
2. Aircraft parts 
 
3. Maintenance labor 
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Aircraft Hours CLS Cost Contract Cost Per Flying Hour 
U-28 73,200 $112.8M $1,540  
PC-12 11,300 $16.4M $1,558  
C-145 7,700 $20.8M $2,549  
 
Table 4.   AFSOC Light-Fixed-Wing Annual CLS Cost Per Flying Hour105 
In order to provide a more realistic cost of ownership, aircraft unit 
price and projected lifespan need to be considered. Table 5 accounts for these 
factors: 
 
Aircraft A/C Price Lifespan Cost per Year per A/C A/C Cost Per Flying Hour
U-28 $15M 15 Years $1.0M $355 
PC-12 $6M 15 Years $0.4M $354 
C-145 $10M 15 Years $0.67M $571 
 
Table 5.   AFSOC Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Cost Per Flying Hour106 
Finally, combining the data from the two previous tables paints a 
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Aircraft CLS Aircraft Total Cost per Flying Hour 
U-28 $1,540 $355 $1,895 
PC-12 $1,558 $354 $1,912 
C-145 $2,549 $571 $3,120 
 
Table 6.   AFSOC Light-Fixed-Wing Total Cost Per Flying Hour107 
While these particular AFSOC aircraft may or may not be a good fit 
for the situational mission requirements of all organizations seeking SOF aircraft, 
the cost data presented above represent the approximate price range to be 
expected for potential light-fixed-wing operators. 
Another model for determining CPFH is one developed by Conklin 
and de Decker, a U.S. based general aviation consulting firm. The cost 
information below is the total aircraft variable cost an operator can expect to incur 
per hour during aircraft operation. Variable costs include the following, and are 
shown in Table 7. 
1. Fuel cost 
 
2. Fuel burn 
 
3. Fuel additives 
 
4. Aircraft parts 
 
5. Maintenance labor 
 
6. Landing and parking fees 
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Aircraft Variable Cost Per Flying Hour 
Cessna 208 Caravan $614  
Pilatus PC-6 Porter $557  
Britten-Norman BN2T-4S Defender $805  
Viking Air DHC-6 Twin Otter $1,151 
 
Table 7.    General Aviation Variable Cost Per Flying Hour108 
When extrapolated over an expected lifespan of 15 years, the 
CPFH among these four aircraft is comparable, with the exception of the 
considerably more expensive Twin Otter (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. 15-Year CPFH Total Per Aircraft 
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There is a wide variance of CPFH rates presented above, from the 
seemingly inexpensive PC-6 Porter ($557/hour) to the more costly C-145 
Skytruck ($3,120/hour). Further analysis is recommended to determine the most 
appropriate costing model, based upon the organization’s specific requirements. 
2. Mission Effectiveness 
a. Specifications 
The following comparison offers four impressive light-fixed-wing 
aircraft options, ranging from the 6,173-pound Pilatus PC-6 Porter to the top of 
the light-fixed-wing weight threshold Viking Air DHC-6–400 Twin Otter. There are 
many specifications and data in Tables 8 and 9, ranging from interior dimensions 
to takeoff and landing distances. 
 

















C-208109 9 254 4.5 33 84 4105 
BN2T-4S110 9 327 4.2 105 - 1598 
PC-6111 7 117 3.9 106 - 2381 
DHC-6112 10 384 4.9 88 38 2500 
 
Table 8.   Select Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Specifications113 
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C-208116 8750 175 871 2500/1740 1405/915 
BN2T-4S117 8500 176 861 1855/1934 1167/1012 
PC-6118 6173 125 500 1444/1043 646/417 
DHC-6119 12500 182 700 1940/1500 700/515 
 
Table 9.   Select Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Performance Data120 
Like all procurements, for each benefit of a platform’s capabilities, 
there is also a cost. For instance, along with the Porter’s outstanding landing 
ground roll of merely 417 feet comes a dismal cruise airspeed of 125 knots and a 
range of only 500 nautical miles. Likewise, the Twin Otter’s impressive maximum 
useful load of 4,105 pounds buys it a takeoff ground roll of 1,405 feet, twice as 
much as two of the other aircraft analyzed. A simple way to thin the herd of 
choices is to decide whether a single-engine aircraft is acceptable to the 
organization and its mission requirements. While there is a lot to be said for the 
redundancy of a multi-engine aircraft, especially considering the austere terrain  
in which SOF often maneuver, single-engine aircraft provide a significant amount 
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of “bang for the buck” and today’s single-engine powerplants have a top-notch 
record of safety. 
b. Capabilities 
Aircraft dimensions, capacities, and performance data are 
fundamental in determining the appropriate platform for a particular organization. 
However, even more important is whether an aircraft can effectively support a 
given mission set. Specifically, this portion of the study investigates individual 
platforms and scores them against a set of “hallmark qualities” that SOF aviation 
demands. These qualities allow for an objective measurement of each aircraft 
candidate’s capabilities. The traits were adopted from the 2008 study conducted 
by the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre (NSCC), in which aircraft 
criteria were outlined.121 The exhaustive list stipulated by NSCC, found at 
Appendix A, was tailored to suit the purposes of this study—light (and medium) 
fixed wing SOF aircraft. In Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 a “Yes” score implies that 
the aircraft manufacturer offers the capability. A “No” score implies that the 
capability is not a factory option for the aircraft. Given proper resources and time, 
in nearly all cases the aircraft examined can be modified to perform any of these 
hallmark qualities. Therefore, a binary scoring system was chosen in an effort to 
maintain maximum objectivity. By scoring aircraft in this manner, the study 
implies that no one quality is more valuable than another. In utilizing this study, 
organizations may determine that their interests value certain traits more than 
others, and should weight those traits accordingly. 
There are three qualities that all SOF aircraft must possess. It is 
imperative that this type of aircraft can be safely maneuvered in instrument 
meteorological conditions in low illumination as well as daylight-visual 
meteorological conditions. In order to effectively support SOF activities, adverse 
flight conditions must not degrade mission capability. Weather radar, de-icing 
                                            121
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equipment, and night vision goggle-compatible cockpits were among the 
considerations of this Hallmark Quality. As shown in Table 10, all subject aircraft 
are available from the factory with suitable equipment. 
Advanced, stand-alone cockpit navigation tools are essential in the 
austere environments in which special operations often occur. An example of this 
type of equipment is a satellite-based navigation system, independent of ground-
based navigational aids. Systems such as this allow for area navigation (RNAV) 
and self-contained instrument approaches. Aircraft with RNAV capability can be 
flown on any desired flight path within the coverage of ground- or spaced-based 
navigation aids, within the limits of the capability of the self-contained systems, or 
a combination of both capabilities. 122 As such, RNAV aircraft have better access 
and flexibility for point-to-point operations. An effective, reliable, and user-
compatible communications suite is not negotiable for a special operations 
aircraft. To the point, poor communications between air and ground operators is 
a common thread in degraded or failed military missions. Equipment such as 
both line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight (e.g., satellite) radios and secure voice 
capability were considered here. With the exception of the Cessna 208 Caravan, 
all subject aircraft are factory-ready with this Hallmark Quality. The lack of an 
advanced communications suite on the Caravan is the only thing that kept it from 
scoring in this category.123 
The final hallmark quality that SOF aircraft must possess is aircraft 
survivability equipment (ASE). Examples of ASE include missile-warning systems 
that deploy flares and/or chaff in defense of the aircraft and lead blankets that 
protect the aircrew and passengers/equipment from small arms fire. None of the 
subject aircraft are factory-equipped with ASE. The lack of ASE on these 
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platforms is not abnormal, however. Regional threat assessments largely dictate 
the level of ASE required for aircraft buyers, and a “standard configuration” 
offered by an aircraft maker would not make good business sense. Aircraft 
scoring on these hallmark qualities of all SOF Aircraft is shown in Table 10. 
 
Hallmark Qualities of ALL SOF Aircraft 
Quality C-208 BN2T PC-6 DHC-6
Day/Night/All Weather Capable 1 1 1 1 
Enhanced Nav/Communication Capable 0 1 1 1 
Threat Environment Survivable (Defensive 
Capabilities Dictated by Intended Utilization) 0 0 0 0 
Score Total 1 2 2 2 
 
Table 10.   Hallmark Qualities of ALL SOF Aircraft (Yes=1 point & No=0 points) 
As Figure 7 (Chapter II) defines, specialized air mobility 
encompasses flight operations in diverse environments (e.g., hostile, denied, 
politically sensitive), and under varied circumstances (e.g., clandestine, low 
visibility, overt). There are three hallmark qualities that stand out among SOF 
aircraft. First of all, these aircraft must be capable of taking off and landing on 
multiple surfaces. Landing surfaces considered were dirt, packed-sand, grass, 
and gravel, as these are examples of landing zones encountered in support of 
special operations. As shown in Table 11, all subject aircraft scored well in this 
category, with options such as low-pressure tires, twin-caliper disc brakes, and 
reinforced undercarriages.124 
Next, the ability to operate in different flight regimes is important for 
special operations support. For example, mission requirements may dictate a 
high-altitude over flight of politically sensitive areas and subsequent descent to a 
low-level infiltration of assaulters, followed by a medium-altitude over watch 
assignment. Again, all of the aircraft examined herein scored well in this 
                                            124
 Pilatus Aircraft Limited, PC-6.  
 59
category. While none of the platforms are pressurized, they all have an 
operational ceiling of 25,000 feet, ample for aircraft in the light-fixed-wing 
category. Likewise, with their low stall speeds, these aircraft perform 
exceptionally well in the low altitude environment. 
The final hallmark quality of specialized air mobility is the capability 
to airdrop personnel and equipment. Three out of four aircraft examined are 
airdrop-ready upon leaving the production floor. From the trap door in the Pilatus 
PC-6 Porter125 to the sliding doors of the Cessna C-208 Caravan126 and Viking Air 
DHC-6 Twin Otter,127 these platforms are well suited for airdrop. The only 
exception, as shown in Table 11, is the Britten-Norman BN2T Defender. It is built 
with traditional automobile-like doors for cockpit access and cargo storage.128 
 
Hallmark Qualities of Specialized Air Mobility 
Quality C-208 BN2T PC-6 DHC-6
Austere/Semi-prepared Field Capable 1 1 1 1 
Ability to operate in various flight regimes 
(high, medium, and low altitude structure) 1 1 1 1 
Airdrop Capable 1 0 1 1 
Score Total 3 2 3 3 
 
Table 11.    Hallmark Qualities of Spec. Air Mobility (Yes=1 point & No=0 points) 
Light-fixed-wing aircraft have become a popular choice in recent 
years for the ISR mission. This type of aircraft is typically fairly simple to operate 
at altitude, which helps to make crewmember resources available for tasks 
beyond traditional “stick and rudder” requirements. To be an effective ISR 
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platform, a commitment to target saturation is pivotal—this boils down to time on 
station. For the purposes of this study, “Persistent Coverage” is defined as 
endurance to remain on target for at least six hours unrefueled. As shown in 
Table 12, all four aircraft met or exceeded the standard. From the Caravan’s six 
and one-half hours flight time129 to the Twin Otter’s lengthy 12.5 hours of 
endurance (with Guardian 400 factory modification),130 the aircraft are well suited 
to meet the intent of this Hallmark Quality. 
Another attractive aspect of light-fixed-wing aircraft for ISR is their 
compatibility with a wide range of commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) 
sensors. These widely available electro-optical and infrared imaging turrets are 
natural solutions to the surveillance problem. While Cessna does not offer a 
sensor package on the Caravan,131 the three other manufacturers examined 
produce surveillance-ready aircraft.   
In addition to stand-alone surveillance capability, integration into 
the wider network of ISR platforms is vital to the analysis of intelligence 
collection. In other words, if an aircraft’s imagery feed is not transmitted to the 
appropriate agency in a timely manner or if an aircraft cannot receive critical 
updates from another airborne asset, mission degradation is probable. While the 
“Special Mission” Porter and Viking Air’s “Guardian” are equipped with robust 
sensor suites, according to Britten-Norman’s Government Business Director, only 
the Defender can be fully integrated into the wider ISR network upon leaving the 
factory floor.132 
Likewise, as shown in Table 12, the Defender is the sole aircraft in 
this group that has a communications suite robust enough to provide command 
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and control of the battle space and effectively deconflict airspace.133 In addition to 
multiple radios, tools that enhance aircrew situation awareness (e.g., cockpit 
displays, data exchange networks) are key to this Hallmark Quality. 
 
Hallmark Qualities of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Quality C-208 BN2T PC-6 DHC-6
Provide Persistent Coverage 1 1 1 1 
Conduct any Combination of 
IMINT/SIGINT/ELINT/COMINT Gathering 0 1 1 1 
Can be Integrated into Wider ISR Network 
(Inflight Dissemination and Receipt of ISR data) 0 1 0 0 
Provide Battlefield C2 and Airspace Deconfliction 0 1 0 0 
Score Total 1 4 2 2 
 
Table 12.    Hallmark Qualities of ISR (Yes=1 point & No=0 points) 
The final mission set that a SOF aviation-capable nation should be 
able to perform is precision aerospace fires. Referencing Figure 7 (Chapter II), 
this SOF mission is based on providing combatant commanders with an 
integrated capability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess targets. The 
first four tasks involved in providing this capability are readily accomplished with 
the sensor suites detailed above. However, none of the aircraft investigated are 
munitions-ready from the manufacturer. While all of these aircraft can be (and in 
some cases, have been) weaponized, none can employ munitions and provide 
battle damage assessment (BDA) upon procurement. 
The second quality that complements precision aerospace fires is 
the acquisition and maintenance of positive identification of both friendly and 
enemy ground forces. The main ingredient here is an aircraft equipped with a 
multispectral imaging turret and capable tracking mechanism. As described 
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above, and shown in Table 13, all subject aircraft except the Caravan possess 
this capability direct from the manufacturer.134 
 
Hallmark Qualities of Precision Aerospace Fires 
Quality C-208 BN2T PC-6 DHC-6 
Precise Munitions Employment/BDA Capable 0 0 0 0 
Positive ID of Friendly/Enemy Forces Capable 0 1 1 1 
Score Total 0 1 1 1 
 
Table 13.    Hallmark Qual. of Prec. Aerospace Fires (Yes=1 point, No=0 points) 
E. AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY 
All of these aircraft (and many other similarly capable platforms) are 
widely employed across the globe, both in the general aviation sector as well as 
in military/security organizations. This readily available aspect is important for the 
aggressive level of ambition in fielding aircraft that is traditionally associated with 
SOF enterprises. Additionally, there are many companies that specialize in 
modifying and militarizing aircraft (e.g., Alliant Techsystems and Sierra Nevada 
Corporation). Businesses like this utilize both commercially available and 
proprietary products for modification, and often outfit aircraft with carry-on/carry-
off (COCO) systems. A light-fixed-wing aircraft with COCO capabilities that can 
be appropriately outfitted to suit its user would be a remarkable force multiplier 
for any SOF organization—a multi-mission aircraft with multiple configurations. 
One option that this study does not address is the alternative of acquiring 
excess defense articles rather than new acquisitions to fill the void of organic air 
support for SOF. Further research is required to exhaust all efforts of this 
prospect. However, there are literally thousands of aircraft in preservation at the 
309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG), located at 
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Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ. For example, as of December 2011, the U.S. 
Department of State had a fleet of at least four Beechcraft C-12B King Airs in 
storage at AMARG.135 A procurement such as this, while small in numbers, could 
pacify the immediate need for air support and buy a SOF organization time to 
fully assess the long term requirements. Furthermore, the projected mothballing 
of U.S. military aircraft over the next several years is a promising acquisition 
option for other would-be SOF-capable air components. Finally, a survey of all 
coalition partners or allies, for example, could reveal additional light-fixed-wing 
aircraft in the category of excess defense articles. 
F. RECENT LIGHT-FIXED-WING SUCCESSES 
1. U-28 
The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has fielded two well-
regarded SOF aircraft programs within the past seven years. To answer the call 
for an immediate need for Tactical ISR to support special mission units, 
USSOCOM began a rapid fielding initiative in 2005. By the summer of 2006, the 
first U-28s were delivered to Hurlburt Field, FL, and the aircraft have been 
forward deployed ever since. The expeditious manner in which these aircraft 
began shaping the battlefield was unprecedented. An acquisition of this caliber is 
typically a multi-year process, while the selection, purchase, modifications, and 
testing of the U-28 was executed inside of one year. This model is one in which 
other organizations can mirror in their quest for SOF-capable air support. Airmen 
of the newly reactivated 319th Special Operations Squadron of AFSOC were 
charged with employing the modified Pilatus PC-12 aircraft in support of global 
pursuit efforts to curb extremist terrorist networks. The U-28 provides a manned 
light-fixed-wing, on-call/surge capability for improved tactical airborne 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The U-28 fleet evolved from 
COTS aircraft, and were modified with communications gear, aircraft survivability 
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equipment, electro-optical sensors, and advanced navigation systems. The 
advanced communications suite is “capable of establishing DoD/NATO data-
links, full-motion video, data, and voice communications.”136 The U-28 has shown 
outstanding reliability and performance under maintenance provided by 
contractor logistics support, and like the four aircraft examined in this study, it is 
certified to operate from short and semi-prepared airfields. 
When USSOCOM resolved to purchase PC-12s to overcome the shortfall 
in ISR capability, the program of record called for six aircraft. However, after only 
one year on the battlefield the decision was made to procure additional aircraft. 
The operational successes and overwhelming feedback from various users 
prompted USSOCOM to once again act quickly. Within months, additional U-28s 
were showing up on the ramps of airfields worldwide, and by 2010 there were 22 
mission aircraft and four PC-12 trainers. In March 2012, USSOCOM approved 
the transfer and modification of an additional 10 PC-12s from within AFSOC, 
which will bring the total number of mission aircraft to 32 (plus five PC-12 
trainers).
137
 To complement the sharp increase in equipment, the number of U-28 
aircrew has also blossomed. By 2010, AFSOC activated a new operational 
squadron (34th Special Operations Squadron) to house half of what had become 
a force structure of nearly 300 Airmen. In its first year of operations, the 34th 
Special Operations Squadron flew 4,476 deployed sorties for a total of 24,618 
combat flight hours – 67.4 hours per day. In conjunction with the 319th Special 
Operations Squadron, they enabled 465 EKIA (enemy killed in action) and the 
capture of 1,151 detainees, and targeted 253 High Value Individuals.138 The 
manned ISR capability that the U-28 program provides to the joint SOF 
community is unparalleled, and its unique role is pivotal to the U.S. National 
Security Strategy to defend against violent extremist terrorism. 
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Over the past six years of U-28 operations, there have been multiple block 
upgrades to the aircraft. In order to stay in tune with technological advances, 
spiral developments of the aircraft equipment have been many. While most 
weapon systems go years between block upgrades, the U-28 has averaged one 
major overhaul per year since inception.139 The enduring fiscal requirements 
associated with a platform such as the highly technical U-28 must be considered 
when an organization considers procurement of a fleet of SOF-capable aircraft. 
2. Nonstandard Aviation (NSAv) 
The second program that has made a significant impact on worldwide 
SOF efforts is AFSOC’s Nonstandard Aviation (NSAv) enterprise. To answer the 
urgent call for dedicated air support to small, detached teams, AFSOC took 
delivery of its first light-fixed-wing aircraft in January 2008. Until now, small 
operational detachments were using contract air to get to and from isolated and 
remote locations.140 The NSAv aircraft selected by USSOCOM were to operate in 
permissive areas, adorned with nondescript paint schemes, allowing the aircrew 
and their users to “hide in plain sight.” The 318th Special Operations Squadron, 
located at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, was assigned the Pilatus PC-12, 
and would eventually take delivery of 10 of these aircraft. By the next year, the 
squadron began operating the Polish-built PZL Mielec M-28 Skytruck,141 which in 
2012 was re-designated the C-145.142 The Skytruck is a virtual workhorse for 
STOL operations and low-cost, low-altitude airdrop. Finally, the NSAv fleet was 
rounded out with a medium-fixed-wing aircraft. The German-made Dornier 328, 
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re-designated C-146 in 2012,143 would be the NSAv community’s long-haul 
platform of choice. As a stopgap during the C-146 acquisition/modification 
process, several Bombardier Dash 8 (DHC-8–200) aircraft were leased and 
operated in support of SOF. The option to lease aircraft is a valid consideration 
for would be special operations air-capable organizations. Depending on the 
longevity of a proposed program, this alternative might make a better business 
case than outright aircraft purchase. 
The NSAv community has received glowing praise from supported 
commanders, and has accumulated an impressive set of statistics since its 
recent inception. Table 14 details the number of sorties, passengers transported, 
cargo hauled, hours flown, and pounds of airdropped supplies. What is most 
telling about these figures is that a two ship of PC-12 aircraft was put into service 
in July 2008, but AFSOC did not deploy any additional assets until October 2010. 
That said, the data for the C-145 and C-146 represent merely two years of 
operational employment. 
 
NSAv Mission Accomplishments (2008–2012) 
Aircraft Sorties Pax Cargo (lbs) Hours Flown Airdrop (lbs)
PC-12 9,532 19,032 1,885,000 15,360 0 
C-145 692 2,474 503,000 2,600 667,000 
C-146 1,069 2,144 399,000 2,559 0 
Total 11,293 23,650 2,787,000 20,519 667,000 
 
Table 14.   NSAv Mission Accomplishments (2008–1012)144 
In 2012, USSOCCOM underwent several changes in mission priorities 
and asset realignments. The NSAv community was affected by these 
developments, and will be downsized beginning in November 2012. In 2010, the 
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Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review directed the doubling in 
size and capability of AFSOC’s Combat Aviation Advisory force.145 One way 
USSOCOM is complying with this congressional directive is by transferring NSAv 
C-145s to Duke Field, FL to be flown in support of the Aviation FID mission. 
Additionally, combatant SOF commanders’ seemingly insatiable desire for ISR 
saturation has led to the USSOCOM order to modify all NSAv PC-12 aircraft to 
provide increased U-28 capability. Aircraft modifications will begin in 2013, and 
once complete, AFSOC’s NSAv enterprise will be all but dissolved.146 The 17 
Dornier C-146 procurements will be the sole remaining NSAv aircraft. The main 
take-away from USSOCOM’s reorganization of assets is the “modularity” of light-
fixed-wing aircraft. Within months, the 10 C-145s will be reconfigured from strictly 
a SOF-support passenger/cargo-hauling platform to be used in USSOCOM’s 
higher-priority Building Partner-Nation Capacity mission.147 
G. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this portion of the study was to provide a survey of the costs 
and benefits associated with procuring, developing, and employing light-fixed-
wing aircraft in direct support of SOF. It was made clear that the employment of 
SOF, by definition, is the discerning way ahead in the lean times with which 
many nations across the globe are faced. When appropriately fielded and tasked, 
an organic light-fixed-wing capability serves as a force multiplier in support of all 
three major SOF air mission sets. Furthermore, there are efficiencies to be 
gained by procuring a multi-mission platform in lieu of fielding multiple single-role 
aircraft. Various capabilities were examined, providing a wide range of 
alternatives from which to choose. A deliberate analysis of precisely the amount 
                                            145
 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 30, 
retrieved October 18, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. 
146
 Timothy Pyeatt, e-mail communication to the authors, October 17, 2012. 
147
 Admiral McRaven has made it clear that building partner-nation capacity and mitigating 
the conditions that make populations susceptible to extremist ideologies is a key element in 
attaining USSOCOM’s first priority: winning the current fight. See “Q and A with Admiral 
McRaven,” Special Warfare, April-June 2012, vol. 25, issue 2, 
http://static.dvidshub.net/media/pubs/pdf_10170.pdf. 
 68
of capabilities desired versus required for an organization’s level of ambition 
would further assist in determining which aircraft(s) to acquire. As greater 
resolution is gained with respect to the necessary capabilities for a light-fixed-
wing platform(s), the large array of alternatives will taper. If an aircraft with said 
capabilities happens to be inventoried by a nation’s alliance member(s) or is in 
excess defense article supply, pursuing one of these options would discernibly 
be the recommendation of this research. That said, leaders should resist the 
temptation to accept readily available aircraft that fail to meet the agreed upon 
capabilities to support the demands of direct action, special reconnaissance, and 
military assistance. To settle for lackluster aircraft capabilities would not only 
undermine SOF’s charter, but would also be a disservice to the aircrew, the 
special operations users, and the strategic objectives of national/multinational 








IV. MEDIUM-FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Why Medium-Fixed-Wing Aircraft 
In establishing a special operations forces (SOF) aviation capability, allied 
nations should consider the utility and requirement for a medium-fixed-wing 
aircraft. As SOF operations continue to grow in necessity, and as allies shift the 
way they go to combat, a capable and cost effective medium-fixed-wing SOF 
aircraft could prove invaluable. The primary focus of such an aircraft should be to 
perform specialized air mobility, but nations should also consider performing 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision aerospace 
fires missions. Since the costs and obligations of possessing a fleet of medium-
fixed-wing aircraft are greater than that of light-fixed-wing aircraft, nations should 
consider a crawl-walk-run approach when employing these aircraft for a SOF air 
group. Prior to investing in aircraft modifications to perform ISR and precision 
aerospace fires, nations should first master SOF mobility. Figure 14 displays this 
logical progression of SOF aviation abilities. 
 
Figure 14. Logical progression for medium-fixed-wing SOF aviation. 
The 1st Air Commando Group of the China-Burma-India theater and the 
Carpetbaggers of the European theater in World War II proved that SOF airlift is 
essential when conducting unconventional infiltrations and operations behind 
enemy lines. Without SOF aviation, the unconventional warfare waged by the 











would have most likely failed. 148 The importance of specialized air mobility is still 
appreciated in current times. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) echoes this importance in their Special Air Warfare 
Manual. The manual states, “The primary mission of special operations air forces 
is enhanced air mobility—specialized air transport activities via fixed-wing, rotary-
wing, or tilt-rotor aircraft.”149 U.S. Air Force doctrine goes further to address the 
need for Specialized Air Mobility: 
The AFSOF mobility mission area includes the rapid global airlift of 
personnel and equipment through hostile airspace to conduct 
operations and to enable air mobility across the range of military 
operation. AFSOF deployment readiness and unique training 
contribute to their constant readiness status and to their ability to 
quickly respond. They often are the first forces to deploy on a 
global scale. AFSOF capabilities accommodate all operational and 
physical environments—especially conditions of adverse weather, 
darkness, and denied territory. Operations may be conducted with 
a single aircraft or as part of a larger force package and are 
normally conducted during one period of darkness.150 
2. Multi-Mission Considerations for Medium Aircraft 
If nations procure medium-fixed-wing aircraft for SOF utilization there are 
opportunities for them to further their capabilities by expanding to multi-mission 
aircraft, capable of performing all three SOF aviation missions—(1) specialized 
air mobility, (2) ISR, and (3) precision aerospace fires. Many nations are plagued 
with domestic financial problems while they still need to maintain a modern 
defense force to combat domestic, regional, and transnational threats. A multi-
mission platform could be a cost-effective solution to expanding needed 
capabilities. Lt. Gen. Kisner stated in his Speech to XXI Seminario Internacional 
Cátedra Alfredo Kindelán, “a synchronized Smart Defense approach…is the key 
to success.”151 Recent U.S. Air Force (USAF) documents addressing pending 
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force structure changes also call for an increased emphasis on multi-mission 
platforms as a cost saving tool. The document states, “…multi‐role platforms 
provide more utility across the range of the potential missions for which we are 
directed, while we look to retire all aircraft of a specific type, allowing us to also 
divest the unique training and logistic support structure for that aircraft.”152 
Having such platforms would build a solid foundation for long term SOF 
effectiveness and future operational growth. 
B. AIRCRAFT CANDIDATES 
There are two families of medium-fixed-wing aircraft that warrant 
evaluation for SOF utility. The first is the Alenia Aeramacchi C-27 Spartan family. 
The C-27J and its no longer produced predecessors, the G-222 and C-27A, are 
“multi-functional, military aircraft designed and built for tactical transport and to 
support combat operations. [They can] operate autonomously in remote and 
austere environments and can take off and land from unprepared surfaces and 
airstrips.”153 The second family consists of the Airbus Military CASA/IPTN CN235 
and the stretched fuselage version, the EADS CASA C295. Both aircraft are 
“highly versatile tactical airlifters … capable of short take-off & landing (STOL) 
performance from unprepared short, soft and rough airstrips, as well as low level 
flight characteristics.”154 
These two families of aircraft were chosen due to being combat proven, 
high usage among allies, relatively inexpensive acquisition costs, and capability 
to load cargo via a ramp door. Over 345 CN235s and C295s have been delivered 
to nations around the world and another 16 are on order.155 In addition, 
approximately 50 C-27Js have been delivered and approximately 30 G-222 and 
                                            152
 U.S. Department of the Air Force, “USAF Force Structure Changes,” 3. 
153
 Alenia Aermacchi North America, “C-27J Spartan Tactical Transport Aircraft,” 2010,  
http://www.aleniana.com/c-27j-spartan-tactical-transport-aircraft. 
154
 Airbus Military, “C295 The Tactical Workhorse,” 
http://www.airbusmilitary.com/Aircraft/C295/C295About.aspx and Airbus Military, “CN235 The 
Lower Cost Tactical Airlifter,” http://www.airbusmilitary.com/Aircraft/CN235/CN235About.aspx. 
155
 Airbus Military, “C295 Tactical Workhorse,” and Airbus Military, “CN235 Lower Cost.” 
 72
C-27As are still in service.156 Table 15 demonstrates the large number of NATO 
allies already operating the G-222, C-27A, CN235, and C295. 
 
Aircraft NATO Member Nations That Operate 
G-222 and C-27A U.S., Italy (mostly retired) 
C-27J Bulgaria, U.S., Italy, Greece, Lithuania, 
CN235 France, U.S., Spain, Turkey 
C295 Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, Spain 
Table 15.   NATO Members Operating C-27A, C-27J,  
CN235, and C295 aircraft.
157
 
 1. Alenia Aermacchi C-27
158
 
The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is designed to access a wide range 
of airfields, including short unprepared strips in hot and high altitude conditions, 
while transporting heavy loads. Development for the C-27J aircraft is complete 
and aircraft are in production. The C-27 airframe manufactured in Naples, Italy, 
by Alenia Aeramacchi is modified by L-3 Communications of Waco, TX to 
become the C-27J. The C-27J is operated by the USAF Air National Guard.  
C-27J general characteristics include: a maximum takeoff weight of almost 
70,000 pounds, an aircraft length of approximately 74 feet, and a wingspan of 
approximately 94 feet. The C-27J has the option of being equipped for 
probe/drogue refueling, and it has a maximum payload range in excess of 1,000 
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miles.159 The G-222/C-27A will not be considered as a viable platform for 
analysis since it is no longer manufactured and parts needs are no longer 
supported by the builder. 
 
Figure 15. Photo of C-27J160 
2. CASA/IPTN CN235 
The Airbus Military CASA/IPTN CN235 is a twin turbo-prop plane with 
STOL performance that is capable of operating from unpaved runways and has 
proven low level flying characteristics for tactical penetration. Development is 
complete and the current model, the CN235–300, has been in production since 
1998. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operates a maritime patrol variant of the 
CN235 as the HC-144 Ocean Sentry. With over 270 sold to over forty operators 
worldwide, the CN235 is one of the best-selling airlifters in the medium aircraft 
segment.161 CN235 general characteristics include: a maximum takeoff weight of  
 
                                            159
 U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, AC-XX AoA,22–23. 
160
 C-27J Spartan, “Photo of C-27J,” http://www.c27j.com/image-galleries/image-galleries/c-
27j-spartan-flying. 
161
 Airbus Military, “CN235 Lower Cost.” 
 74
almost 35,000 pounds, an aircraft length of approximately 70 feet, and a 
wingspan of approximately 84 feet. The CN235 has a maximum payload range of 
nearly 450 miles.162 
 
Figure 16. Photo of CN235163                                                                  
3. EADS CASA C295 
The EADS/CASA C295 aircraft development is complete and aircraft are 
in production for primarily non-U.S. and commercial customers. The C295 is a 
further developed version of the CN235, but with a stretched fuselage, 50% 
greater payload capacity, and upgraded engines. The C295 can receive fuel in 
flight via optional probe and has a maximum payload range in excess of 700 
miles. A modified variant of the C295 is sold as a maritime patrol and 
antisubmarine warfare platform. C295 general characteristics include: a 
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maximum takeoff weight of approximately 51,100 pounds; an aircraft length of 
approximately 80 feet; and a wingspan of approximately 84 feet.164 
 
Figure 17. Photo of C295
165
 
C.  MEASURES OF ANALYSIS 
1. Cost  
Two areas of consideration are analyzed when evaluating the candidate 
aircraft for cost. They are pure unit acquisition cost and the average cost per 
flying hour (CPFH). 
a. Acquisition Cost 
 Aircraft acquired as excess defense articles or as used will have a 
greatly reduced acquisition costs. Costs of aircraft acquired in this manner will 
vary based on included purchases of support equipment, parts spares, etc.  
Table 16 displays estimated basic aircraft cost if nations were to contract for new  
C-27J, CN235, or C295 purchases. Although not evaluated in this study,  
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Table 16 includes recent USAF C-130J acquisition costs for comparison. 
Because a multitude of factors can influence an aircraft purchase price (e.g., 
number purchased, warranty contracts, nation purchasing), all dollar values are 
estimated ranges derived from previous U.S. government programs. 
 
Per Unit Acquisition Cost 
C-130J $66–70M Estimates based on C-130J Department of Defense (DoD) 2012 USAF Budget Estimates166 
C-27J $32–37M Estimate based on C-27J DoD 2012 USAF Budget Estimates167 
CN235 $20–25M 
Based on U.S. Bureau of Land Management 
Smokejumper aircraft Screening and Evaluation Board 
(SASEB) CN235 data. 168  FY2003 cost of $17.085 
inflated for 2012 using DoD Procurement inflation 
tables.169 
C295 $27–32M 
Based on Air Force Special Operations Command 
(AFSOC) AC-XX AoA. BY2008 cost inflated using DoD 
Procurement inflation tables.170 
Table 16.   Medium-fixed-Wing Aircraft Per Unit Acquisition Cost Estimates. 
b. Cost Per Flying Hour 
 Various U.S. agencies currently operating the platforms being 
analyzed—the USAF, USCG, and Department of State (DoS) calculate CPFH 
differently. Using open source data it is difficult to do an “apples-to-apples” 
comparison, so the costs presented are all rough estimates comprised from 
various sources. 
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C-27J: The CPFH for the C-27J is widely disputed in the defense industry 
media and DoD. Many articles assert that the C-27J CPFH is similar to that of the 
C-130J ($9,100/hr).171 These reports attempt to include inaccurate manpower and 
other indirect costs. When calculating a CPFH composed of POL, unit operations 
costs, repair parts, and depot maintenance costs, the CPFH is reported to be 
about $5,300 per hour.172   
CN235: The CN235 CPFH was derived from estimated USCG HC144 
rates, and it is made up of similar expense categories to the C-27J CPFH. CPFH 
estimates for a CN235 are around $3,000. Conklin & de Decker, an open source 
civilian aircraft cost estimator service, estimates the variable cost of the civilian 
variant of the CN235 to be $1,784 per hours. This variable cost includes fuel, 
airframe maintenance, labor and parts, engine restoration and miscellaneous 
costs. This evaluation is focused on military utilization, so the $3,000 CPFH will 
be used for comparison.173 
C295: No U.S. Government agencies currently operate the C295. In order 
to obtain a CPFH the theory that maintenance costs tend to be proportional to 
acquisition costs is used.174 The C295 has an approximate 15% less acquisition 
cost when compared to the C-27J. Therefore, a 15% less CPFH would result in 
an approximate CPFH of $4,500.   
The above CPFH present a large disparity. By assuming 400 hours per 
year flight time per aircraft and the current CPFH increased for inflation, it is 
possible to calculate a 15 year cumulative operating cost. Over a 15 year 
timespan the CN235 and C295 have the lowest cumulative operating cost. Figure 
18 illustrates that over this same period the C-27J would cost 15% more than the 
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C295 and 45% more than the CN235 to operate. All three candidate aircraft are 
significantly less expensive to operate than the C-130J. 
 
Figure 18. Cumulative 15-Year CPFH estimates per aircraft (based on 400 
flight hours per year inflated at an average rate of 1.8% annually) 
2. Mission Effectiveness 
The second measure of analysis that is considered for this study is the 
mission effectiveness of each candidate aircraft. This effectiveness analysis will 
compare both aircraft performance specifications and capabilities. These 
specifications and capabilities are then evaluated against the hallmark qualities 
of SOF aviation, as listed in Chapter II. 
a. Specifications 
Table 17 shows that the C-27J surpasses both the CN235 and 
C295 in cargo capacity, range, and flight speed. Of note, the C-27J is able to 
transport over 5,000 pounds more cargo than the C295 at a 30% increased 
range. The CN235 is a smaller aircraft and as such has a smaller cargo capacity 
and reduced flight range when compared to the C-27J and C295. The CN235 
does outperform both the C-27J and C295 in terms of STOL capabilities. While 
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the CN235 and C295 are able to transport more standard military pallets, both 
aircraft are over 2 feet shorter in cargo compartment height allowances than the 
C-27J. This reduced height allowance could prove problematic when transporting 
larger military cargo such as hard top High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 
Vehicles (HMMWVs) and small helicopters. Figure 19 shows a graphical 
depiction of the cargo height differences between the aircraft. 
Table 17.   Aircraft Specification Analysis175 
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Specification C-27J CN235 C295 Notes 
Operating weight (empty) 37,478 lbs 20,850 lbs 30,000 lbs C-27J weight approximate 
Max Takeoff weight 67,241 lbs 36,380 lbs 51,000 lbs C295 at overload 
Max Fuel weight 21,459 lbs 9,150 lbs 13,600 lbs   
Max Cargo weight 25,353 lbs 13,120 lbs 20,400 lbs   
Range (Ferry) 3,200 nm 2,730 nm 2,900 nm   
Range (Max poayload) 1,000nm  390 nm 700 nm C-27J at 22,046 lbs cargo 
Range (13,200 lbs) 2,300 nm 390 nm 2,000 nm 
C-27J at 13,227 lbs cargo 
CN235 at 13,120 lbs cargo 
Max Cruise Speed 315 KTAS 245 KTAS 260 KTAS   
Max Altitude 30,000 ft 30,000 ft  29,000 ft   
Takeoff field Length (Max 
GW, STD @SL) 2,100 ft 2,077 ft 3,619 ft   
Landing field Length (at 
normal MTOW) 2,264 ft 2,025 ft 2,392 ft   
External Length 74 ft 7 in 70.2 ft 80 ft 2 in   
Length (Cargo) 28 ft 1 in 31 ft 8 in 41 ft 8 in   
Height (Cargo) 8 ft 4 in 6 ft 3 in 6 ft 3 in   
Pallet Positions (88x108) 3 4 5   
Troops 68 51 71   
Paratroops 46 36 50   
Medivac 36 stretchers 21 stretchers 24 stretchers   
APU in flight operable Yes  No No   
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Figure 19. Images Comparing C-27, CN-235,  
C295 Cargo Compartment Size176 
b. Capabilities 
Determining if an aircraft can support a mission set is of the utmost 
importance when selecting an aircraft. This portion of the study evaluates the 
medium-fixed-wing aircraft candidates and scores them against a set of “hallmark 
qualities” that SOF aircraft should have. The qualities were adopted from the 
2008 study conducted by the NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre 
(NSCC), in which aircraft criteria for SOF aircraft performance capabilities were 
outlined. The exhaustive list stipulated by NSCC, found at Appendix A, was 
tailored to suit the purposes of this study—light (and medium) fixed wing SOF 
aircraft.177 In Tables 18, 19, 20, 21 a “Yes” score implies that the aircraft 
manufacturer offers the capability. A “No” score implies that the capability is not a 
factory option for the aircraft. Given proper resources and time, in nearly all 
cases the aircraft examined can be modified to perform any of these hallmark 
qualities. Therefore, a binary scoring system was chosen in an effort to maintain 
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maximum objectivity. By scoring aircraft in this manner, the study implies that no 
one quality is more valuable than another. When utilizing this study, 
organizations may determine that their interests value certain traits more than 
others, and should weight those traits accordingly. 
As previously stated, all SOF aircraft must possess three qualities: 
be day/night/all-weather capable, possess enhanced navigation and 
communication equipment, and be threat survivable. Aircraft must be able to 
safely maneuver in instrument meteorological conditions in low illumination as 
well as daylight-visual meteorological conditions. In order to support SOF 
activities, adverse flight conditions must not degrade mission capability. Weather 
radar, de-icing equipment, and night vision goggle-compatible cockpits were 
among the considerations of this Hallmark Quality. As show in Table 18, all 
subject aircraft are available from the factory with suitable equipment. 
Enhanced navigation and communications systems are also 
essential to SOF aircraft. Enhanced navigation systems include satellite-based 
navigation system, radar altimeters, redundant flight management systems, and 
traffic collision avoidance systems (TCAS). Enhanced communications systems 
include line-of-sight radios, beyond line-of-sight (e.g., satellite) radios, secure 
voice capability and data link capabilities. Again, all candidate aircraft satisfy this 
hallmark quality. However, the C-27J is slightly more capable—standard 
equipped with the AN/APN-241 high resolution ground mapping synthetic 
aperture radar and the Inmarsat SATCOM voice and data link radio. 
The final hallmark qualities that all SOF aircraft must possess is to 
be threat environment survivable. Transiting hostile or denied areas requires the 
aircraft to have adequate aircraft survivability equipment (ASE). Example of ASE 
range from basic chaff/flare dispensers and missile warning systems, to 
advanced radar detection and directed infrared and laser countermeasures. 
Table 18 shows only the C-27J comes standard equipped with ASE systems. 
The C-27J incorporates a fully integrated defensive systems suite consisting of 
the AN/AAR-47A(V)2 (missile and laser warning system), AN/APR-39B(V)2 
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(radar warning receiver), and the AN/ALE-47(V) (chaff and flare dispenser).178 
Such ASE is an optional modification on the CN235 and C295.179 
 
Hallmark Qualities of ALL SOF Aircraft 
Quality C-27J CN235 C295 
Day/Night/All Weather Capable 1 1 1 
Enhanced Nav/Communication Capable 1 1 1 
Threat Environment Survivable (Defensive 
Capabilities Dictated by Intended Utilization) 1 0 0 
Score Total 3 2 2 
Table 18.    Hallmark Qualities of ALL SOF Aircraft  
(Yes=1 point & No=0 points)180 
As stated in Chapter II, specialized air mobility may include 
infiltration, exfiltration, or resupply missions in diverse environments (e.g., hostile, 
denied, politically sensitive), and under varied circumstances (e.g., clandestine, 
low visibility, overt). Three hallmark qualities are essential to this mission set. The 
first hallmark quality that is important for specialized air mobility is the ability to 
operate into austere or semi-prepared airfields. All three candidate aircraft exhibit 
short landing field characteristics, possess tricycle type landing gear suitable for 
semi-prepared and grass runways, and possess differential disc brakes. As 
shown in Table 17, the C295 does require a longer landing and takeoff airfield 
length. 
The second quality—the ability to operate at various flight altitudes 
(regimes)—is essential as diverse environments may dictate operations in low, 
                                            178
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medium, or high altitude. All three aircraft are able to operate in the region of 
30,000 feet, and all three aircraft are able to pressurize for crew and passenger 
comfort. With their reinforced wing structures and low stall speeds, all three 
aircraft also perform exceptionally well in low altitude flight. 
The final, and arguably most important, capability a SOF airlift 
aircraft must possess is the ability to airdrop. All three aircraft have similar 
capabilities and can perform paratroop and cargo airdrop operations out dual 
side doors and hydraulically operated cargo ramps. The major item differentiating 
the three aircraft is their size. The C-27J is rated to carry 46 fully equipped 
paratroops, can accommodate a max single run cargo airdrop of 13,228 pounds 
and is cleared for low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) and high 
altitude delivery (HAD) operations. Being slightly smaller, the CN235 can only 
accommodate 36 paratroops, but can still accomplish LAPES and HAD 
operations.181 The standout airdrop aircraft in the medium-fixed-wing field is the 
C295. The C295 can accommodate 50 fully equipped paratroopers, a 17,637 
single run cargo airdrop, and can accomplish LAPES and HAD operations.182 
Table 19 shows that the three candidate aircraft all scored similarly in the 
capability to perform specialized air mobility. 
 
 Hallmark Qualities of Specialized Air Mobility 
Quality C-27J CN235 C295
Austere/Semi-prepared Field Capable 1 1 1 
Ability to operate in various flight regimes (high, 
medium, and low altitude structure) 1 1 1 
Airdrop Capable 1 1 1 
Score Total 3 3 3 
Table 19.   Hallmark Qualities of Spec. Air Mobility (Yes=1 point & No=0 points) 
                                            181
 U.S. Bureau of Land Management, EADS CASA CN-235, 2.  
182
 Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, “Airbus Military C-295.”  
 84
Similar to light-fixed-wing aircraft, medium-fixed-wing aircraft have 
become popular platforms to utilize for ISR missions. In order to perform ISR 
operation in support of SOF, aircraft should have four hallmark qualities. The 
first—the ability to provide persistent coverage—is essential when performing 
ISR. For this study, persistent coverage is defined as endurance to remain on 
target for at least six hours unrefueled. Based on the aircrafts max cruise speed 
and ferry range, the C-27J has a flight duration of over 10 hours and both the 
CN235 and C295 exceed 11 hours max flight time. While these endurance times 
far exceed the six hour threshold, they will be reduced when mission equipment 
increases their operating weight and drag.   
None of the candidate aircraft come standard-equipped to perform 
IMINT, SIGINT, ELINT, or COMINT gathering. While all aircraft can be modified 
to perform such ISR missions, modified versions of the CN235 and C295 are 
available from the factory. The CN235 and C295 are manufactured in maritime 
patrol and surveillance variants, and can be factory equipped with Airbus 
Military’s Fully Integrated Tactical System (FITS). The FITS system integrates a 
variety of mission sensors that can be used for various ISR mission tasks.183 
While not presently available, Alenia Aermacchi is developing a version of the  
C-27J that will also be factory ready to perform ISR with its enhanced electro-
optical/infrared (EO/IR) targeting sensors.184  
In addition to performing stand-alone ISR, the ability to integrate 
fully into larger ISR networks has become crucial. Without the ability to transmit 
and receive real-time ISR data, mission updates, and retaskings, a platforms 
utility as an ISR asset is questionable. Of the three medium-fixed-wing aircraft, 
only the C-27J is factory ready to perform such tasks. The C-27J is equipped 
with Inmarsat compatible voice and data link satellite communications radios. 
                                            183
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Inmarsat systems allow for the dissemination and receipt of voice, data, and 
video feeds while in flight.185 Again, the optional surveillance variants of the 
CN235 and C295 are better equipped to integrate into an ISR network. 
As Table 20 shows, all three candidate aircraft come equipped to 
perform battlefield command and control (C2) and airspace deconfliction. All 
three aircraft have robust communications suites and cockpit displays sufficient 
to provide the needed situational awareness.186   
 
Hallmark Qualities of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
Quality C-27J CN235C295
Provide Persistent Coverage 1 1 1 
Conduct any Combination of IMINT/SIGINT/ELINT/COMINT 
Gathering 0 0 0 
Can be Integrated into Wider ISR Network 
(Inflight Dissemination and Receipt of ISR data) 1 0 0 
Provide Battlefield C2 and Airspace Deconfliction 1 1 1 
Score Total 3 2 2 
Table 20.   Hallmark Qualities of ISR (Yes=1 point & No=0 points) 
The final mission set that nations investing in SOF aviation should 
consider is precision aerospace fires. As Figure 7 explains, the key to precision 
aerospace fires is the ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess targets 
by using some sort of weapon system. Typically, the ability to find, fix, track, 
target, and assess are accomplished by utilizing a variety of ISR equipment. 
Table 20 shows that none of the aircraft come standard equipped with such 
systems. In addition, none of the aircraft come munitions ready from the 
manufacturer. The C-27J, CN235, and C295 all have wing hardpoints that could 
be utilized for munitions carrying, but none are equipped with any sort of fire 
control management systems which is necessary for munitions employment. 
                                            185
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However, manufacturers for both the C-27J and the CN235 have mentioned 
interest in developing weaponized platform variants.187 
Similar to the ability to perform battle damage assessment (BDA), 
performing identification of friendly and enemy forces typically involves the 
utilization of multispectral imaging systems. Crewmembers on the candidate 
aircraft may be able to rudimentarily do this through visual identification out a 
window, but some sort of sensor suite would be required to perform this task with 
reliable accuracy. Table 21 shows that none of the candidate aircraft are capable 
of performing precision aerospace fires as equipped from the factory. 
 
Hallmark Qualities of Precision Aerospace Fires 
Quality C-27J CN235 C295 
Precise Munitions Employment/BDA Capable 0 0 0 
Positive ID of Friendly/Enemy Forces Capable 0 0 0 
Score Total 0 0 0 
Table 21.   Hallmark Qual. of Prec. Aerospace Fires (Yes=1 point, No=0 points) 
D. AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY 
Another consideration for nations selecting a medium-sized fixed wing 
platform for SOF use is aircraft availability. Allies should consider both availability 
of aircraft as excess defense articles (EDA) for purchase through other nations 
and purchases and leases of new aircraft. Speed of acquiring newly 
manufactured or leased aircraft is not addressed in this study. 
Options of C-27J availability exist in both EDA purchases and new 
purchase/lease. In early 2012, the USAF identified the fleet of 21 USAF C-27Js 
as being part of more than 280 aircraft identified for retirement as part of ongoing 
DoD budget cuts.188 The future of these aircraft, which are still in production, is 
                                            187
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being analyzed by the USAF Air Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD). Although plans have not been finalized, the USAF is compiling lists of 
possible options as well as list of organizations and agency that may be 
interested in purchasing the C-27Js.189 After hearing that the USAF would divest 
their fleet of C-27Js, Alenia announced their lack of support for the United States 
selling the 21 aircraft through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). In an interview, 
Alenia’s CEO, Giuseppi Giordo, stated “If they want to sell additional airplanes as 
FMS, we will support them, but not those 21 airplanes.” Giordo further stated, “In 
fact, we will do our best—not only us, but the Italian government—not to support 
those planes. In that case the U.S. government will be competing against our 
international campaigns in a market where 21 airplanes is a big deal.”190 
A final, and more costly, option for C-27J procurement is to contract with 
Alenia for purchase of new aircraft. Estimated procurement costs were 
addressed in the previous section of this chapter. 
Aircraft availability for the CN235 and C295 is a different story than the  
C-27J. Both aircraft are still in production and are heavily proliferated around the 
world. As there are no excess U.S. defense articles of these aircraft, the only 
option for allies to acquire them would be through a purchase from a third 
party/nation or a new lease or purchase. Both variants are heavily utilized in the 
civilian aviation market so viable lease and purchase options may exist, both 
from Airbus Military, as well as other third party vendors. 
E. RECENT MEDIUM-FIXED-WING SUCCESSES  
Many other military programs demonstrate how allies could succeed in 
modifying medium-fixed-wing aircraft to perform SOF mobility, SOF ISR, and 
SOF precision aerospace fires missions. Three examples of such programs are 
presented below. 
                                            189
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1.   AC-130W Stinger II and KC-130J Harvest Hawk 
In 2008, AFSOC began work on an acquisitions program, AC-XX, 
evaluating the utility of equipping medium-fixed-wing aircraft to perform a “mini-
gunship” mission. Significant amounts of test data was acquired, including live 
fire testing and blast over pressure analysis for firing a modified ATK Bushmaster 
II 30mm gun out the side of a C-27.191 Following the Congressionally directed 
cancellation of the AC-XX program, efforts were redirected to modifying 
AFSOC’s fleet of AC-130W (dubbed Dragon Spear) aircraft. At the same time, 
the U.S. Marines began a similar program, piggybacking on AFSOC’s successes, 
to modify their KC-130J (dubbed Harvest Hawk) aircraft. Both aircraft were 
modified to perform battlefield overwatch and are equipped with a precision strike 
package—consisting of a 30mm gun, stand-off precision guided munitions, small 
diameter bombs, and a suite of visual and EO/IR sensors. Both programs used 
proven rapid acquisition principles and combat proven technology to modify and 
deploy the aircraft to combat in less than 18 months.192 Estimated costs of 
modifying the AC-130W aircraft with the precision strike package is $39 million 
apiece.193  
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Figure 20. Picture outlining initial Dragon Spear Configuration.194 
 
Figure 21. Dipiction of U.S. Marine Corps Harvest Hawk Platform.195 
                                            194
 U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Dragon Spear CR-3 Configuration Brief, 
March 15, 2011. 
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2. Gunship in a Box 
 Another medium-fixed-wing modification example is the Air Force 
Research Labs (AFRL) and U.S. SOUTHCOM “Gunship in a Box” program. The 
program is a cooperative research and development agreement with Alliant 
Techsystems Inc. (ATK) to develop a lightweight/low-cost gunship module. This 
effort will provide a true roll-on/roll-off—install in 4 hours/uninstall in 3 hours—
side firing weapons capability that can be used on any number of existing cargo 
aircraft (including C-27J, CN235, and C295). The system, which includes an 
AFRL modified ATK stretched 30mm gun and 500 rounds of ammunition at a 
weight of less than 3000 pounds, will require no modifications to the host aircraft 
and should cost less than $675,000 per unit.
196
 A more integrated variation that 





Figure 22. Picture of the Gunship in a Box roll-on/roll-off 30mm gun pointing 
out rear troop compartment door. 
                                            195
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3. Jordanian Gunship 
In early 2011 Jordan’s King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau 
awarded a contract to ATK to modify two CN235 military transport aircraft with 
ATK’s new Light Gunship Special Mission Aircraft Capabilities package. These 
aircraft—which are scheduled to be delivered in early 2013—will provide an 
enhanced capability to conduct responsive defense, counterinsurgency, and 
border surveillance and security missions.198 ATK’s package will integrate day 
and night electro-optical ISR sensors, integrate targeting fire control equipment, a 
laser target designator, aircraft self-protection equipment, and an armament 
package which includes Hellfire missiles, 2.75-inch rockets, and a M230 link-fed 
30mm gun system.199 While exact cost figures have not been released, the ATK-
modified Jordanian gunship is touted as a “highly-capable and cost-effective 
special mission aircraft” that will not have the steep price tag of the $190M 
apiece like the U.S. AC-130U Spooky gunships.200 
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Figure 23. Picture of proposed Jordanian ATK modified CN235 Gunship.201 
F. CONCLUSION 
This portion of the study was intended to explore procurement, associated 
costs, and capabilities of candidate medium-fixed-wing aircraft. When properly 
employed, it is undeniable that having such a platform provides a solid 
foundation for long-term SOF aviation success. While all three candidate 
platforms possess some of the hallmark qualities, none possess everything 
needed to be a master at all SOF aviation mission sets. Nations interested in 
such platforms for SOF aviation will need to carefully prioritize which qualities 
and capabilities they most value prior making acquisition decisions. 
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V.  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As nations face increased irregular and unconventional threats, special 
operations aircraft continue to emerge as the preferred provider of support to 
special operations ground forces. If properly selected—suitable to help meet an 
individual nation’s strategic priorities—low cost light- and medium-fixed-wing 
aircraft can prove to be treasured assets in support of a nation’s internal and 
external defense. Furthermore, special operations aircraft provide a versatile 
mechanism that is ideally suited to combat ambiguous and dynamic irregular 
threats, while being more agile, flexible, and capable than their conventional 
counterparts.  
A key component of effective special operations aviation is the proper 
selection of aircraft to perform the mission. While highly specialized niche aircraft 
have proven to be vital to the United States’ special operations forces (SOF) 
aviation capability, it is unrealistic to assume that all U.S. allies can secure the 
same aircraft for their use. Most nations lack the resources to procure, maintain, 
and employ these assets with proficiency for the long term. Given the above, this 
study performed and analysis of light- and medium-fixed-wing aircraft to 
determine the relative utility of commercially available off-the-shelf candidate 
platforms. After evaluating candidate aircraft based on measures of cost and 
effectiveness, the study was able to identify a standout aircraft in both the light- 
and medium-fixed categories.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Light-Fixed-Wing 
Evaluation of the four light-fixed-wing aircraft on acquisition cost, cost per 
flying hour (CPFH), aircraft specifications, and scoring against the hallmark 
qualities of SOF aviation revealed that any of these candidate aircraft could 
effectively support SOF missions. As a summary of the cost data presented in 
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Chapter III, Table 22 shows that the Pilatus PC-6 Porter carries the lowest 
acquisition cost and most economical CPFH. Thus, the “true cost to operate” the 
Porter is the lowest of all four candidate aircraft. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the Viking Air DHC-6 Twin Otter is the most expensive candidate to procure, and 
also costs the most to operate, nearly doubling the Lifespan Cost of the Porter. It 
should be noted that these aircraft, while within the parameters set forth to qualify 
as “light-fixed-wing” aircraft, possess substantially different characteristics (e.g., 
specifications and performance).202 
 
Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Cost Data Summary 
Cost C-208 BN2T PC-6 DHC-6 
Acquisition Cost $2.3M $2.1M $2.0M $3.6M 
15-year CPFH $4.8M $6.3M $4.4M $9.1M 
Lifespan Cost $7.1M $8.4M $6.4M $12.7M 
Table 22.    Light-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Cost Data Summary 
 The scoring of hallmark qualities of SOF Aviation produced interesting 
results. As shown in Table 23, the Britten-Norman BN2T-4S Defender had the 
highest aggregate total, scoring well in each category. The category that put the 
Defender out front was its increased capacity to perform the intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission. In the category of specialized air 
mobility, all four candidate aircraft excelled, as each platform was initially 
designed to haul passengers and freight. Interesting to note is that none of the 
four light-fixed-wing aircraft candidates scored well in the precision aerospace 
fires category. This can be attributed to the fact that none of the aircraft 
manufacturers examined offer weaponized versions of their product. 
 
 
                                            202




Light-Fixed-Wing Aggregate Scoring of Hallmark Qualities 
Category C-208 BN2T PC-6 DHC-6
ALL SOF Aviation 1 2 2 2 
Specialized Air Mobility 3 2 3 3 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 1 4 2 2 
Precision Aerospace Fires 0 1 1 1 
Aggregate Total 5 9 8 8 
Table 23.   Light-Fixed-Wing Aggregate Scoring of Hallmark Qualities 
2.  Medium-Fixed-Wing 
Evaluation of the three medium-fixed-wing aircraft for acquisition cost, 
CPFH, aircraft specifications, and against the hallmark qualities of SOF 
aviation—derived in Chapter II—showed that any of the three candidate aircraft 
could perform sufficiently as a SOF platform. The C-27J however, clearly 
represents the best off the shelf medium aircraft for SOF use. Based on aircraft 
acquisition cost and CPFH, Table 24 shows that the CN235 appears to be the 
best option. The CN235 is 33% less in acquisition cost and more than 40% less 
in CPFH than the C-27J.  
 
Medium-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Cost Data Summary 
Category C-27J CN235 C295 
Acquisition Cost $37M $25M $32M 
15-year CPFH $41.7M $23.6M $35.4M 
Lifespan Cost $78.7M $48.6M $67.4M 
Table 24.   Medium-Fixed-Wing Aircraft Cost Data Summary 
However, the CN235 is lacking in certain capabilities. Based on pure 
aircraft specifications (presented in Chapter IV, Table 17), the C-27J is the clear 
achiever. The C-27J can go faster, farther, and carry a heavier load. It is worth 
noting that the C295 can carry more pallets and troops, but the C-27J’s cargo 
compartment is better sized for large military equipment. Also, the CN235 is 
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smaller and therefore slightly more versatile as far as small airfield operations 
and STOL performance. Nations that value a smaller and less expensive aircraft 
should certainly consider the CN235.   
When considering the medium aircraft’s satisfaction of the hallmark 
qualities of SOF aviation, it is clear that all three are factory equipped to perform 
the SOF airlift mission. Table 25 denotes each medium aircraft’s aggregate score 
for the hallmark qualities of SOF aircraft. The C-27J is however more suited to 
operate in a threat environment—an important delineation for a SOF aircraft. 
When considering the aircraft based on the hallmark qualities of SOF ISR, the C-
27J is only slightly better equipped. All three aircraft lack any sort of equipment to 
conduct IMINT/SIGINT/ELINT/COMINT gathering. However, the C-27J is 
supplied with Inmarsat compatible voice and data link satellite communications 
radios that allow it, without modification, to integrate into a larger ISR network. 
Finally, based on the hallmark qualities of precision aerospace fires aircraft, all 
three candidates are ill equipped. In order to perform the strike mission set at 
even a rudimentary level, all candidate aircraft would require significant 
modifications. Given proper amounts of time and money, any of these aircraft 
could be made to better support precision aerospace fires and ISR missions.   
 
Medium-Fixed-Wing Aggregate Scoring of Hallmark Qualities 
Cost C-27J CN235 C295
ALL SOF Aviation 3 2 2 
Specialized Air Mobility 3 3 3 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 3 2 2 
Precision Aerospace Fires 0 0 0 
Total 9 7 7 
Table 25.   Medium-Fixed-Wing Aggregate Scoring of Hallmark Qualities 
When considering the aircraft based on availability, all three again 
represent good options. All three aircraft are in production, so replacement parts 
should be readily available. The only area of difference is that the CN235 and 
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C295 are more widely proliferated in the civilian and military sectors. This could 
afford a nation the ability to acquire aircraft in the used market. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This study sought to analyze select light- and medium-fixed-wing aircraft 
for their utility in support of SOF. In an industry that thrives on commercially-
available off-the-shelf (COTS) modifications and carry-on/carry-off (COCO) 
equipment, it is difficult to determine the “best” platform. To help level the playing 
field, this study eliminated COTS and COCO variations and limited platform 
characteristics to simply what the manufacturers offer as “stock” aircraft. This is a 
very important aspect for prospective SOF aircraft-capable organizations to 
consider. With the appropriate COTS and COCO modifications, any of the seven 
platforms examined have the potential to excel in any one or all of the categories 
deemed essential for SOF aviation. Furthermore, a clear delineation must be 
made as to what the organization deems a priority. A SOF outfit that requires 
airlift but no ISR capability, for example, should disregard prospective platforms’ 
scores in the ISR category. This methodology provides a would-be SOF aircraft-
capable organization a modular approach to which it can add or eliminate 
specific preferences based on individual priorities. Lastly, the model can be 
amended to incorporate a weighted scale to account for the organization’s 
specific priorities. 
As stated above, any of the light-fixed-wing aircraft examined would serve 
as a fine platform to support an organization’s SOF activities. This study’s 
scoring shows that the Britten-Norman BN2T-4S Defender is the most capable 
aircraft upon leaving the manufacturer’s assembly line. The Defender scored well 
in all of the hallmark qualities, but it was a standout performer in ISR missions. 
That said, for an organization that does not place a high emphasis on ISR for its 
acquisition, another candidate platform might be more desirable. If cost savings 
is the overarching priority, this study would recommend the Pilatus PC-6 Porter. 
The Porter carries the lowest price tag as well as the lowest lifespan cost of the 
four light-fixed-wing aircraft examined. While the upfront cost is only $100,000 
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less than the Defender, over an expected lifespan of 15 years, employing the 
Porter would cost $2 million less than the “most capable” platform observed – per 
aircraft. Depending on the size of a nation’s aircraft fleet, this cost variance would 
have a compounding effect. 
Given off-the-shelf capabilities, it is clear that the C-27J represents the 
best aircraft available for medium-fixed-wing SOF utility. The C-27J possesses 
better specifications and capabilities—a fact that may prove more important than 
cost in the long run. If cost savings is the overall priority, the CN235 would still be 
a suitable aircraft for basic SOF aviation use. Over a 15-year life span, the 
CN235 could save a nation $30 Million in costs to acquire and operate. Acquiring 
a medium-fixed-wing aircraft that can flawlessly support all SOF mission sets 
without any modification will prove difficult to any nation. Options for 
modifications do exist—both pre-acquisition from the manufacturer and post-
acquisition aftermarket—to transform any aircraft. Consideration should however 
be given to something that the United States has shown repeatedly—substantial 
or extensive modifications to baseline aircraft can prove costly and complicated. 
Regardless of shortfalls and limitations, any aircraft a nation decides to procure, 
equip, and utilize for SOF support will be a versatile force multiplier in the fighting 
of irregular threats and achieving national objectives. 
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APPENDIX: NATO SOF AVIATION MINIMUM AND DESIRED REQUIREMENTS 
A. TAB 1. NATO AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES REQUIREMENTS 
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present the SOF aircraft criteria established by the 
NATO Special Operations Coordination Center in their 2008 NATO Special 
Operations Forces Study. The list of aircraft performance capabilities delineates 
the minimum and desired capabilities that NATO SOF mobility, strike, and ISR 
aircraft should possess.203     
Table 1. List of NATO Air Mobility Platform Minimum and Desired Capabilities 
SOF Mobility Minimum Requirements 
Low light operations 
NVG operations (compatible lighting) 
Visual low alt navigation/terrain avoidance 
Precise navigation (<75 meters <2 minutes time accuracy) redundant navigation system (i.e., dual INS, 
INS/GPS) 
Secure communications 
IR countermeasures and electronic countermeasures. IR missile warning system  
Operate in austere locations  
FARP capable (receiver or tanker) 
Helicopter air-air refueling 
Reduced visibility landings 
Conduct IR marked landings/drop zone operations 
Conduct unprepared landing surface operations 
Static line, free-fall airdrop 
Auto response to external interrogation by mil/civ ground/air interrogators 
Operate in CBRN environment 
SOF Mobility Desired Requirements 
All environment flight operations 
IFR low altitude/terrain avoidance  
Conduct precision airdrop (<95 meter accuracy) 
Autonomous ID of landing and drop zones 
Conduct automatic computed air release point systems (ACARPS) operations 
Operations into unmarked landing/drop zones 
Discreet or covert operations 
Multi-ship formations with dissimilar aircraft 
Improved situational awareness suite (IR sensor, enhanced radar, etc.) 
Enhanced mission management system with precision timing +/- 30 seconds 
Automated self-contained approach capes 
Extended range (auxiliary tanks or in-flight refueling) 
Beyond Line of sight communications 
Data Link communications 
Directed IR countermeasures 
Ballistic armor 
Automated IRCM/ECM suite 
Reduced aircraft signature 
                                            203
 NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre, Special Operations Forces Study, C13-C18. 
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Table 2. List of NATO Air Strike Platform Minimum and Desired Capabilities 
SOF Air Strike Minimum Requirements 
Conduct positive control of air strike  
Conduct precision munitions employment against static and moving targets 
Conduct ID of friendly forces 
Provide BDA recorder 
Auto response to external interrogation by military/civilian ground/air interrogators 
Precise ordinance delivery in extremely close proximity to friendly forces (inside danger close) 
SOF Air Strike Desired Requirements 
Fire control computer 
Low light level television 
Infrared detection set 
Strike radar (all weather precision engagement) 
 
Table 3. List of NATO ISR Platform Minimum and Desired Capabilities 
SOF Air ISR Minimum Requirements 
Conduct visual/photo collection and thermal imaging 
Conduct wide area sensor surveillance for the detection and tracking of slow moving ground targets and of 
distinguishing between tracked and wheeled vehicles by day or night, clear or adverse weather 
Conduct preplanned imagery collection with in-flight mission update/retasking capability 
Record mission history and electronic support data for post-mission analysis 
Provide in-flight dissemination of reconnaissance imagery and data to appropriate receiving stations, in near 
real time when required 
Provide very high quality imagery at ranges up to 100km 
Provide very high quality optical and IR imagery - clear conditions, day/night 
Provide very high quality optical and IR imagery (IR NIIRS>6) from low to medium altitude (10,000–45,000 
ft) 
Provide very high quality optical and IR imagery (multi-spectral NIIRS>6) from low to medium altitude 
(10,000–45,000 ft) 
Provide very high quality optical and IR imagery (optical NIIRS>7) from low to medium altitude (10,000–
45,000 ft) 
Provide very high quality optical and IR imagery (still frame, video) 
Conduct signal intelligence (SIGINT) 
Transmit collected signals data to appropriate receiving stations, near real time when required 
Conduct unmanned SIGINT missions in operational situations when aircrew should not be risked 
Conduct electronic signals intelligence (ELINT) & communications intelligence (COMINT) 
Conduct wide area sensor surveillance for collecting, direction finding and locating the source of all militarily 
significant radio frequency communications and non-communications signals. Quality of collection should be 
of sufficient quality for emitter recognition 
Operate by day and night in all weathers 
Provide secure, robust, reliable line of sight (LoS) and beyond line of sight (BLoS) communications 
Provide auto response to electronic interrogation by military/civil ground & airborne interrogators 
Provide in-flight review of reconnaissance data 
Integrate into the wider joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (JISR) network 
Provide persistent coverage of an area of interest or broad area coverage of several areas of interest 
Conduct operations at medium altitude (10,000–45,000’) with long endurance (greater than 8 hours) 
Penetrate denied airspace 
SOF Air ISR Desired Requirements 
Attack surface targets by day and night 
Attack surface targets in all weather conditions 
Attack surface targets in all terrain conditions 
Attack fixed hard and soft targets 
Attack mobile targets, including armored vehicles attempting concealment to avoid detection 
Attack ground targets at medium range from the forward line of troops (FLOT) 
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